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. INTRODUCTION 
The authors of several papers in this Symposium have justifiably 
criticized the essay that former Vice President Dan Quayle pub-
lished in Volume 41 of The American University Law Review. 1 Many 
knowledgeable observers of the civil justice system have leveled 
equally legitimate criticism at civiljustice reform initiatives that the 
Bush administration instituted.2 Questionable data, arguable pol-
icy, or overheated political rhetoric supported certain aspects of the 
Vice President's paper, as well as most of the proposals developed 
by the Competitiveness Council that the Vice President chaired8 and 
numerous efforts of the Republican administration in the area of 
civil justice reform.4 
One endeavor, involving executive branch civil justice reform in 
the field of federal civil procedure, apparently was less problematic. 
That effort, which aimed to "facilitate the just and efficient resolu-
tion of civil claims" involving the United States Government, im-
posed a number of requirements on government attorneys who 
participate in civil litigation.5 This is a Bush administration initia-
tive that Vice President Quayle mentioned in his essay and that the 
l. See Dan Quayle, Civil]ustice Reform, 41 AM. U. L. REv. 559, 559-69 (1992) (proposing 
civiljustice reform, including specific proposals in areas such as voluntary dispute resolution; 
discovery, punitive damages, expert witnesses, and attorney's fees). 
2. See, e.g., Robert C. Clark, Why So Many Lawyers? Are They Good or Bad?, 61 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 275, 277-87 (1992) (asserting that former Vice President Quayle's suggestion that there 
are too many lawyers and his analogizing litigation to cancerous growth are shallow and with-
out substantive analysis). See generally Linda S. Mullenix, The Counter-Reformation in Procedural 
justice, 77 MINN. L. REv. 375, 384-408 (1992) (suggesting that Civil Justice Reform Act will 
transform civil procedure into arcane science); Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules 
of Evidence Is Sound: It Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 631-36 (1991) (arguing that 
proposed amendments to expen testimony rules would exclude probative evidence). 
3. See Dan Quayle, Proposed Civil justice Reform Legislation: Proposed Legislation: Agenda/or 
Civil justice Reform in America, 60 U. C1N. L. REV. 979, 985-86 (1992) [hereinafter Quayle, Pro-
posed Legislation] (describing composition of Federal Civil Justice Reform working group, 
under authority of Council on Competitiveness, in memorandum to President Bush outlining 
Council's recommendations). 
4. See Carl Tobias, The Clinton Administration and Civil justice Reform, 144 F.R.D. 437, 443-
45 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Clinton Administration] (describing Bush adminfotration's efforts 
to implement civil justice reform). 
5. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-60 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that purpose of order is to facilitate just and efficient resolu-
tion of civil claims involving U.S. Government, to encourage filing of only meritorious civil 
claims, to improve legislative and regulatory drafting, to reduce needless li1igation, to pro-
mote fair and prompt adjudication before administrative tribunals, and to provide model for 
similar reforms of litigation practices in private sector and states). 
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Clinton administration must rigorously analyze.6 
The Bush administration briefly experimented with civil justice 
reform in the executive branch. President Bush promulgated Exec-
utive Order 12,778 on October 23, 1991, and the order became ef-
fective in January 1992.7 That same month, the United States 
Department of Justice issued preliminary guidance that was in-
tended to assist federal agencies and government lawyers in effectu-
ating the Executive order.8 Nonetheless, the Department only 
finalized those guidelines in the waning days of the Bush administra-
tion. 9 Although the Republican administration did not fully imple-
ment executive branch civil justice reform, the Executive order and 
the accompanying guidance seemed well considered and prescribed 
some procedures that apparently would be efficacious in reducing 
expense and delay, the ostensible purpose of civil justice reform. 10 
Moreover, the order and the guidelines will be in effect until Presi-
dent Clinton modifies them, 11 so that his administration must de-
cide how to treat this nascent reform. 
The factors above mean that civil justice reform in the executive 
6. See Quayle, Civil Justice Reform, supra note 1, at 560 (noting that Executive Order 
12,778 is preliminary step in process of reforming dispute resolution methodology); see also 
Tobias, Clinton Administration, supra note 4, at 441-45 (describing procedural reforms inherited 
by Clinton administration and explaining need for close analysis of initiatives). 
7. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § IO, 3 C.F.R. 359, 367 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that order is effective 90 days after signing). 
8. See Memorandum of Preliminary Guidance on Implementation of the Litigation Re-
forms of Executive Order No. 12,778, 57 Fed. Reg. 3640 (1992) [hereinafter Preliminary 
Memorandum]. 
9. See Memorandum of Guidance on Implementation of the Reforms of Executive Or-
der No. 12,778, 58 Fed. Reg. 6015 (1993) [hereinafter Memorandum]. This memorandum 
was not issued by the Department of Justice untilJanuary 25, 1993, five days after the inaugu-
ration of William Jefferson Clinton as the forty-second President of the United States. Id. at 
6015; see Thomas L. Friedman, Clinton Takes Oath as 42nd President, Urging Sacrifice To "Renew 
America," N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 1993, at A5 (describing inauguration of President Clinton). 
IO. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 359-60, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(listing reduction of expense and delay of litigation, among other considerations, as purpose 
of civil justice reform); Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (noting that Memorandum "pro-
vides guidance for applying Order's provisions" with eye toward order's explicit purpose of 
" 'facilitat[ing] the just and efficient resolution of civil claims involving the United States'"). 
11. See Tobias, Clinton Administration, supra note 4, at 437-38 (noting that President Clin-
ton has opportunity to address numerous issues concerning federal courts and suggesting 
that he carefully analyze executive branch civiljustice reform begun by Bush administration). 
President Clinton's power to modify the order, as stated in the order itself, derives from "the 
authority vested in ... [the] President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of 
America, including chapter 31 of title 28, United States Code, and section 301 of title 3, 
United States Code." Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519; see also 28 U.S.C. §§ 501-530 (1988 & Supp. II 1990) (describing Department of Justice 
as executive department and describing nature and responsibilities of Attorney General); 3 
U.S.C. § 301 (1988 & Supp. III 1991) (authorizing presidential power to delegate authority to 
agency officials). See generally Cass Sunstein, Cost Benefit Analysis and the Separation of Powers, 23 
ARIZ. L. REV. 1267, 1268-69 (1981) (describing increasing use of Executive orders to regulate 
agency actions). 
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branch warrants systematic assessment to ascertain whether the 
Clinton administration should continue experimenting with the con-
cept and, if so, how the administration can most effectively imple-
ment the reform. This Article undertakes that effort. The Article 
first traces the origins and development of civil justice reform in the 
area of federal civil procedure, emphasizing the Bush administra-
tion's attempts to institute executive branch reform. The Article 
then critically evaluates the Bush administration initiative and finds 
it sufficiently promising to warrant additional effectuation and ongo-
ing experimentation, particularly if the endeavor is vigorously im-
plemented, rigorously evaluated, and recalibrated. The third Part 
of this Article affords numerous suggestions that the Clinton admin-
istration should follow to effectuate, and to continue experimenting 
with, civil justice reform in the executive branch. 
I. THE ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT OF CIVILjUSTICE: REFORM 
A. Civil justice Refonn Under the Civil justice Refonn Act of 1990 
1. The 1990 statute 
The statutory background of civil justice reform in the field of fed-
eral civil procedure requires only brief treatment here because 
others have thoroughly examined the topic. 12 Congress enacted the 
Civil Justice Reform Act (CJRA or Act} 13 in 1990 out of concern 
about growing abuse in civil litigation, especially during the discov-
ery process, and in response to the increasing expense entailed in 
resolving civil cases and shrinking access to federal courts for 
resolving civil lawsuits. 14 Since the mid-l 970s, numerous federal 
judges had been asserting that a litigation explosion was taking 
place in the federal courts, resulting in increased discovery and liti-
gation abuse.15 
12. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2, at 384-406 (analyzing civil justice reform of 1980s 
and arguing that Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990 is noble but ill-advised piece of legislation 
that will only complicate civil procedure);Jeffrey J. Peck, "Users United": The Civilj11Stice Rejonn 
Act of 1990, LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, at 105, 105-09 (addressing background 
and substantive components of Civil Justice Reform Act); Carl Tobias, Civil j11Stice Refonn 
Roadmap, 142 F.R.D. 507, 507-09 (1992) (charting recent developments in civiljustice reform 
efforts among legislative, judicial, and executive branches of Federal Government). 
13. Civil Justice Reform Act of 1990, §§ 101-650, 28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. 1992). 
14. See SENATE COMM. ON THEJUDICIARY,JUDICIAL IMPROVEMENTS ACT OF 1990, s. REP. 
No. 101-416, lOlst Cong., 2d Sess. 103 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6802, 6804-05 
(stating that legislation is response to increasing cost of civil litigation and problems created 
by lack of adequate judicial resources); see also Peck, supra note 12, at 105-06 (discussing atti-
tudes of litigators and federal trialjudges concerning nature and extent of litigation costs and 
delays). 
15. See, e.g., National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 
(1976) (upholding district court's dismissal of antitrust action due to party's failure to obey 
discovery order and noting that extreme sanction of dismissal is appropriate where party 
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The CJRA requires that each of the federal trial courts develop a 
civiljustice expense and delay reduction plan by December 1993.16 
The purposes of the plans are "to facilitate deliberate adjudication 
of civil cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation 
management, and ensure just, speedy and inexpensive resolutions 
of civil disputes." 17 Under the CJRA, every federal district court 
must adopt a plan once it has examined a report compiled by an 
advisory group for the district. is 
The advisory groups, which the courts named within ninety days 
of the statute's enactment, were to be "balanced," including attor-
neys and individuals who are representative of litigants involved in 
the districts' civil cases. 19 The Act mandates that the groups com-
prehensively analyze the courts' civil and criminal dockets and iden-
tify the major sources of expense and delay, as well as trends 
involving case filings and demands placed on the districts' re-
sources. 20 In formulating recommendations, the groups must con-
sider the needs and circumstances of the courts, litigants, and 
litigants' lawyers and must ensure that all three contribute signifi-
cantly to decreasing expense and delay, thus facilitating access to 
the civil justice system.21 After districts receive the advisory groups' 
reports and recommendations, the courts are to review them and 
confer with the groups.22 The districts then must consider, and may 
adopt, the eleven principles, guidelines, and techniques listed in the 
legislation and any other procedures deemed appropriate for reduc-
ing expense or delay. 23 
shows flagrant bad faith and callous disregard ofresponsibilities); Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor 
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 740-41 (1975) (noting that discovery provisions of Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure are liberal with potential for abuse); Dissent from Order Amending the 
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 446 U.S. 997, 1000 (1980) (Powell,J., dissenting) (dissent-
ing from adoption of amendments because amendments do not go far enough to rectify intol-
erable abuse of discovery process where party with greater resources prevails through threat 
of delay and expense, thereby denying justice to poorer opponents); see also RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 1-130 (1985) (describing federal courts as in 
state of crisis due to explosion in caseload, lack of judicial resources, and need for more 
coherent, practicable judicial philosophy). 
16. 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992). 
17. Id. 
18. Id. § 472. 
19. Id. § 478(b). 
20. Id. § 472(c)(l). 
21. Id. § 472(c)(2)-(3). 
22. Id. § 472(a). 
23. See id. § 473(a)-(b). The legislation proposes the following specific principles and 
guidelines: (1) systematic, differential treatment of civil cases tailored to accommodate each 
specific case's complexity and length of time; (2) early and ongoing control of pretrial process 
by judicial officer; (3) careful, deliberate monitoring of discovery by judicial officer through a 
discovery management conference where complexity of case so demands; (4) encouragement 
of cost-effective exchange of information through cooperative discovery devices; (5) requiring 
that all discovery motions be accompanied by certification of moving party that a reasonable 
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2. Early implementation 
Thirty-five groups presented reports and suggestions to their 
courts before December 31, 1991, and thirty-four districts issued 
plans by that date to qualify for the status of Early Implementation 
District Courts (EIDCs).24 The Committee on Court Administration 
and Case Management of the Judicial Conference of the United 
States officially designated the thirty-four courts as EIDCs on July 
30, 1992.25 The remaining advisory groups and courts are proceed-
ing with civil justice planning, although only two districts promul-
gated civil justice plans in 1992,26 and a small number of courts will 
probably adopt plans before the deadline of December 1993.27 
Thoroughgoing assessment of the civil justice expense and delay 
reduction plans that the EIDCs developed is relatively unimportant 
to understanding the most significant issues that executive branch 
reform implicates. Nonetheless, the assessment below affords a 
general examination and specific examples of those aspects of early 
civil justice planning under the 1990 legislation that are most perti-
nent to civil justice reform efforts in the executive branch. 
Nearly all EIDCs, relying on the reports and recommendations of 
their advisory groups, apparently engaged in the kind of introspec-
tion and prescribed the types of procedures that Congress envi-
effort has been made to reach agreement with the opposing party; (6) use of alternative dis· 
pute resolution where appropriate; (7) requiring each party to submit a discovery manage· 
ment plan at the initial pretrial conference; (8) requiring that at each pretrial conference each 
party be represented by an attorney who has the authority to bind the party regarding all 
matters previously identified by the court; (9) requiring that all requests for extension of dis· 
covery deadline or postponement of trial be signed by both attorney and party making the 
request; (10) setting up a neutral, nonbinding evaluation program where a neutral court of· 
ficer considers the legal and factual basis of the case; and (11) requiring that, upon court 
notice, an attorney with the power to bind each party be present or available by telephone 
during any settlement conference. Id. 
24. See Carl Tobias,]udicial Oversight of Civil justice Refonn, 140 F.R.D. 49, !i6 (1992) [here· 
inafter Tobias,judicial Oversight] (listing 34 Early Implementation District Courts (EIDCs)). 
25. See, e.g., Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, judicial Conference of the U.S. Com-
mittee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Gene E. Brooks, Chief Judge, U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District oflndiana 1 Uuly 30, 1992) (on file with The American 
University Law Review) (approving Southern District of Indiana as EIDC and recognizing that 
each district has own peculiar problems); Letter from Robert M. Parker, Chair, Judicial Con· 
ference of the U.S. Committee on Court Administration and Case Management, to Paul G. 
Hatfield, Chief Judge, U.S. District Court for the District of Montana 1 Uuly 30, 1992) (on file 
with The American University Law Review) (approving District of Montana as EIDC). 
26. U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEW. DIST. OF Mo., CIVILjUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY RE· 
DUCTION PLAN (Apr. 30, 1992) [hereinafter WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI PLAN]; U.S. DIST. 
COURT FOR THE w. DIST. OF TEX., CIVILjUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCl10N PLAN (Nov. 
30, 1992). 
27. A number of advisory groups issued reports in 1992. These include advisory group 
reports from the Southern District of Iowa, the Eastern District of Louisiana, the District of 
New Mexico, the Middle District of North Carolina, the Middle District of P1:nnsylvania, the 
District of South Dakota, the Eastern District of Tennessee, the Northern District of Texas, 
the Western District of Texas, and the Western District of Washington. 
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sioned. 28 The courts apparently attended to the legislative 
objectives of decreasing expense and delay in civil lawsuits, carefully 
evaluated their civil and criminal dockets, and considered and 
adopted the eleven statutorily prescribed principles, guidelines, and 
techniques for facilitating litigation. 29 
A number of procedures with which the EID Cs are experimenting 
closely resemble those that are significant components of executive 
branch civil justice reform. Practically all of the districts have em-
ployed measures that are intended to encourage settlement. 30 An 
important means by which courts promote settlement is through the 
use of various forms of alternative dispute resolution (ADR).31 A 
few courts even impose onerous requirements covering participa-
tion in ADR.32 For instance, the Western District of Missouri ran-
domly and automatically assigns one-third of its civil cases to an 
28. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF CAL., CIVILJUSTICE ExPENSE AND DE-
LAY REDUCTION PLAN 1-2 (Dec. 3, 1991) [hereinafter EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAN] 
(stating that plan was result of diligent efforts of advisory group to identify instances in which 
civil case management could be enhanced); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEN. D1sT. OF GA., CIVIL 
JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 26-54 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter NORTHERN 
DISTRICT OF GEORGIA PLAN] (reviewing local rules of practice as amended pursuant to CJRA); 
U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE E. DIST. OF TEX., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION 
PLAN PURSUANT TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 1 (Dec. 20, 1991) [hereinafter 
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN] (noting that court is "presented with the challenge of 
bringing costs under control so that our society may enjoy the benefits of a civil justice system 
that is affordable, timely, and fair"). 
29. See, e.g.' U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE s. DIST. OF IND., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 1-2 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA PLAN] (stal-
ing that court, pursuant to its obligations as early implementation district, has considered 
recommendations of its advisory committee); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MASS., EX-
PENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 2 (Nov. 18, 1991) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS 
PLAN] (noting that advisory group has made detailed, thorough, ongoing assessment of 
court's civil and criminal docket pursuant to CJRA); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE w. DIST. OF 
MICH., DIFFERENTIATED CASE MANAGEMENT PLAN 1-9 (finding that while court is generally 
meeting its responsibility to litigants to provide " '.just, speedy, and inexpensive determina-
tion of every [civil] action'" as required by CJRA, 17 specific proposals require implementa-
tion to further this goal). 
30. See, e.g., EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA PLAN, supra note 28, at 7 (requiring all 
judges to offer to conduct early settlement conferences); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA 
PLAN, supra note 28, at 7 (requiring two mandatory settlement conferences and continued 
judicial involvement); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEN. DIST. OF w. VA., PLAN FOR CIVIL JUSTICE 
DELAY AND ExPENSE REDUCTION 79-80 (Dec. 18, 1991) (requiring mandatory pretrial confer-
ences in complex cases to develop case management plans and encourage settlement). 
31. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, GUIDANCE ON THE USE OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLU-
TION FOR LmGATION IN THE FEDERAL COURTS 3-9 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter ADR GUIDANCE] 
(describing alternative dispute resolution techniques and procedures, including arbitration, 
mediation, early neutral evaluation, factfinding, and minitrials). 
32. See, e.g., U.S. D1sT. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF N.Y., CIVILJusncE EXPENSE AND DE-
LAY REDUCTION PLAN 15-18 (Dec. 17, 1991) [hereinafter EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK 
PLAN] (requiring that all claims for $100,000 or less be sent to arbitration); EASTERN DISTRICT 
OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 28, at 5-9 (noting that judicial officer may refer cases to various 
ADR programs where appropriate); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE D1sT. OF UTAH, C1v1LJUSTICE 
EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 9-10 (Dec. 30, 1991) (noting that resort to litigation 
process is last resort and that court will experiment with court-supervised mediation, arbitra-
tion, minitrials, and summary jury trials). 
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ADR program and subjects to sanctions litigants who do not partici-
pate in good faith. 33 
Sanctions are another procedure included in the plans of numer-
ous EIDCs that are an important feature of civil justice reform in the 
executive branch.34 A number ofEIDCs authorize judges to impose 
sanctions on litigants and lawyers for failing to comply with various 
provisions in their civil justice plans. 35 Indeed, the Massachusetts 
Plan provides that negligent violations are punishable with sanc-
tions. 36 
Discovery is an additional, significant area in which many EIDCs 
have adopted procedures that resemble those central to executive 
branch reform. For example, a majority of the EIDCs have pre-
scribed some form of mandatory prediscovery disclosure that is pre-
mised on a controversial 1991 proposal to revise the Federal Rules, 
which has now been superseded. 37 A number of EID Cs have also 
33. See WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI PLAN, supra note 26, at 1; cf. U.S. DIST. COURT 
FOR THE s. DIST. OF W. VA., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 81-84 (Dec. 
30, 1991) [hereinafter SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA PLAN] (describing scope of 
mandatory mediation program as potentially including all civil cases within district, with final 
determination made by court). The West Virginia plan refers to ten categories of cases as 
typical for inclusion in the mediation program: commercial and other contract cases, personal 
injury matters, civil rights employment cases, ERISA cases, tax matters, debt collection cases, 
asbestos claims, FELA matters, labor management employment cases, and miscellaneous civil 
actions. SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA PLAN, supra, at 81-84. The plan specifically 
excludes from mediation cases involving administrative agency appeals, habeas corpus and 
other prisoner petitions, forfeitures of seized property, and bankruptcy appeals. Id. 
34. Cf. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(f), 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 (1991), reprinted ill 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that litigation counsel shall take steps to seek i:anctions against 
opposing parties where appropriate). 
35. See SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA PLAN, supra note 29, at 9 (noting that counsel has 
responsibility to prepare case management agenda and present agenda to court at pretrial 
conference or face possible imposition of sanctions); U.S. D1sT. COURT FOR THE V.I. REPORT 
AND PLAN OF THE ADVISORY GROUP 35 (Dec. 23, 1991) (stating that any breach or failure to 
perform under agreement reached at pretrial conference is basis for imposition of sanctions, 
including costs, attorney fees, entry of judgment or agreement, or other appropriate 
remedies). 
36. See DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN, supra note 29, at 67 (observing that district 
court has broad discretion to impose sanctions). 
37. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. AND BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE DIST. OF IDAHO, THE CtVILJUS· 
TICE REFORM ACT OF 1990 EXPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 10-11 (Dec. 19, 1991) [here-
inafter DISTRICT OF IDAHO PLAN] (requiring parties, within 30 days of service of complaint, to 
make initial disclosure, including list of persons with relevant knowledge, list of witnesses, 
copy or description of all relevant records, and existence of any relevant insurance agree· 
ment). After initial disclosure, the parties must also disclose the substance of any expert testi· 
mony and adhere to limits on document production requests, interrogatories, and 
depositions. Id.; see also COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL 
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAi. RULES Ot' CIVIL 
PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 16, 26, reprinted ill 137 F.R.D. 53, 83-84, 87-
88 (1991) [hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL] (proposing discovery requirements, 
including disclosure of persons with relevant knowledge, witnesses, relevant documents, in-
surance agreements, and expert testimony); NORTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA PLAN, supra note 
28, at 14 (noting that court may develop mandatory interrogatories to be answered by each 
party); EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK PLAN, supra note 32, at 4.5 (listing discovery limita· 
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required parties to certify that they have attempted to resolve dis-
covery disputes with their opponents before submitting discovery 
motions to the courts. 38 
B. Executive Branch Civil justice Reform Under the Bush Administration 
1. Executive branch experimentation 
a. Executive order and Department of justice guidance 
z. Background 
On October 23, 1991, President George Bush issued Executive 
Order 12,778, which was intended to facilitate the efficient and fair 
resolution of civil disputes in which the United States Government 
is involved.39 Onjanuary 30, 1992, the Department of justice pub-
lished a memorandum that provided preliminary guidance to fed-
eral administrative agencies and government attorneys on the 
order's prescriptions.40 The major dimensions of the order modify 
the ways that government counsel "conduct discovery, seek sanc-
tions, present witnesses at trial, and attempt to settle cases."41 
The Department of Justice requested that federal agencies and 
government attorneys submit comments recounting their exper-
iences with the order by July 20, 1992, and announced that it in-
tended to review the information tendered, rely on that material in 
tions and other pretrial requirements, including initial disclosure and limits on interrogatories 
and depositions). The Civil Rules Committee dramatically reversed course twice in two 
months on this issue. See Randall Samborn, U.S. Civil Procedure Revisited, NAT'L LJ., May 4, 
1992, at 1, 12 (reporting that Advisory Committee on Civil Rules, after reversing course 
twice, proposed reform of discovery process in order to keep pace with legislative and execu-
tive branch civil litigation reform and thus preserve independence of judiciary). In September 
1992, the Judicial Conference sent a proposal for mandatory prediscovery disclosure to the 
Supreme Court. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFER-
ENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCE-
DURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 26 (Sept. 1992) [hereinafter 1992 PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS]. On April 22, 1993, the Court transmitted that proposal to Congress. See 61 
U.S.L.W. 4365, 4372-76 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (suggesting that amendments to Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure be adopted and take effect on December I, 1993). 
38. See, e.g., U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF PA., C1v1LJusncE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 15 (Dec. 31, 1991) (stating that no motion shall be entered without certifica-
tion by counsel that reasonable effort to resolve dispute has been made); U.S. DIST. CouRT 
FOR THE s. DIST. OF ILL., CIVIL JUSTICE DELAY AND ExPENSE REDUCTION PLAN 14 (Dec. 27, 
1991) (requiring statement that good faith effort to resolve dispute was made at discovery 
conference and requiring statement to recite date, time, and all persons participating in con-
ference); U.S. DIST. CouRT FOR THE DIST. OF WYO., C1v1LJUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUC-
TION PLAN 13 (Dec. 1991) (stating that parties must make reasonable, good faith effort to 
resolve discovery disputes and must certify in writing efforts undertaken to resolve disputes). 
39. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (stating that order is response to growth in civil litigation and current 
litigation practices that have imposed high cost on American individuals, businesses, industry, 
professionals, and all levels of government). 
40. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8. 
41. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640-41. 
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determining how the final guidance could best refine the order's op-
eration, and issue those final guidelines.42 In the summer of 1992, 
the Department also sought the perspectives of its own lawyers, fed-
eral agency counsel, and United States Attorneys on implementa-
tion of the guidelines.43 
After a Justice Department ad hoc committee received the submis-
sions from government counsel, it evaluated the comments and re-
vised the preliminary guidance in light of them. 44 The committee 
met numerous times after July 20, 1992, and drafted several itera-
tions of the final guidelines.45 The committee completed its work in 
December 1992, and one of the final official acts of William Barr, the 
Bush administration Attorney General, was signing the guidance on 
January 15, 1993.4 6 
Because the final guidelines that the Department of Justice issued 
in January 1993 made comparatively few substantive changes in, and 
indeed principally clarified, the preliminary guidance, the final 
guidelines will be examined in the text of this Article only when they 
elaborate or modify the preliminary guidance. Moreover, the final 
guidelines are primarily described in this Part, while they are criti-
cally analyzed in the second Part of this Article.47 
iz. Description 
Section 1 (a) of Executive Order 12, 778 mandates that counsel for 
the United States undertake reasonable efforts to notify persons 
whom the Government is considering suing of government intent to 
file suit and to afford the individuals an opportunity to settle the 
controversy.48 The content and timing of reasonable attempts de-
pend on the particular circumstances of each case, and government 
attorneys need not provide notice in unusual situations, such as 
cases where notice would strategically disadvantage the United 
42. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640-41. 
43. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, Special Counsel to the Assistant At-
torney General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of justice, Washington, D.C. Oan. 29, 1993). 
44. Telephone Interview withjanice Calabresi, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney 
General, Civil Division, U.S. Department of justice, Washington, D.C. Oan. 19, 1993). 
45. Id. 
46. See Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6015 (noting that§§ 4(a), 4(b), and 7(d) of order 
require Attorney General to coordinate efforts by federal agencies to implement reform, issue 
guidelines, and define scope of order). 
47. The description follows the requirements essentially as provided in the order, but 
the critical analysis combines certain aspects of the requirements. 
48. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(a), 3 C.F.R. 359, 360 (1991), reprinted i11 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (declaring that no complaint initiating civil litigation shall be filed 
before reasonable effort is made by government counsel to notify persons and attempt to 
settle); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that notice may be 
provided either by agency or litigating counsel for purpose of settling dispute). 
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States.49 
Section 1 (b) commands government lawyers to analyze the pros-
pects for settlement whenever they secure adequate information. 50 
Counsel thereafter have an ongoing responsibility to evaluate the 
possibility of settlement and when appropriate must offer to partici-
pate in settlement conferences.51 Section l(c) is intended to en-
courage settlement by requmng that government lawyers 
participate in ADR programs, if this activity will foster prompt, fair, 
and efficient resolution of civil cases. 52 
Section 1 ( d) of the Executive order covers discovery. 53 Section 
l(d)(l) pertains to the disclosure of core information.54 This sub-
section states that, early in civil actions, government attorneys must 
49. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that notice is not needed 
where it would defeat purpose oflitigation); see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (not-
ing that agency efforts to resolve disputes prior to litigation can afford requisite notice and 
stating that government counsel need not repeat notice unless additional notice would be 
productive). 
50. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(b), 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (re-
quiring litigation counsel to make reasonable efforts toward settlement both before and dur-
ing trial); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (suggesting that litigation 
counsel meet with supervising attorney and affected agency to discuss acceptable terms of 
settlement before settlement conference); Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6016 (stating that 
litigation counsel should evaluate pos,sibility of settlement throughout trial but that no unrea-
sonable concession or offer should be extended nor any agency policy evaded for sake of 
litigation position); infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text (discussing § l(g) of Executive 
order, which encourages early filing of motions that could resolve litigation, and observing 
that when government attorneys do file early, they should not seek to participate in settlement 
conferences until dispositive motions are resolved). 
51. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (stating that litigation counsel 
are to "move the court for such a conference" when reasonable). 
52. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(c), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(stating that, when feasible, claims should be resolved through informal negotiations, discus-
sions, and settlements before utilization of formal, structured ADR process or court proceed-
ing, but that ADR process should be used where litigation counsel determines it is warranted 
in context of particular claim and will materially contribute to prompt, fair, and efficient reso-
lution of dispute); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641 (suggesting that 
litigation counsel meet with affected agency concerning desirability of ADR procedure when 
such procedures have likelihood of success). In making this decision, government counsel 
"should consider the amount and allocation of the cost of employing ADR." Preliminary 
Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641; see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6017 (stating that 
each agency, when determining whether or not to use ADR, should utilize skill and training of 
litigation counsel to ensure that use of such procedures in particular case will not result in 
binding determination as to Government without exercise of agency's discretion; that manner 
or terms of resolution will not compromise interest of United States; and that cost of using 
ADR will not be exorbitant). 
53. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
54. See id. § l(d)(l), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (noting that "core infor-
mation" includes names and addresses of people having relevant information and location of 
relevant documents); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42 (discussing 
§ l(d)(l) of order, which requires government counsel to make reasonable efforts to reach 
agreement with opposing parties regarding exchange of information); supra note 37 and ac-
companying text (noting that majority of EIDCs have adopted some form of mandatory 
prediscovery disclosure and citing Civil Rules Committee's attempt to amend Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure). 
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off er to participate in the mutual exchange of certain important ma-
terial. 55 Counsel can only make such offers when no dispositive mo-
tions are pending, when other parties consent to exchange 
analogous information, and when the court will enter that agree-
ment as a stipulated order.56 
Section 1 ( d) (2) governs the review of proposed document re-
quests. 57 Government lawyers can pursue the discovery of docu-
ments only after complying with requirements intended to ensure 
that proposed discovery is reasonable in light of the circumstances 
of the case.58 The attorneys must base the reasonableness decision 
on enumerated considerations that are similar to those present in 
rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The considerations 
include: (1) whether the requests are duplicative, unduly burden-
some, or expensive, given the requirements of the suit; (2) the 
amount in controversy; (3) the importance of the questions at issue; 
and (4) whether a more convenient way to secure the documents 
exists.59 Section l(d)(3) mandates that government lawyers attempt 
to resolve disagreements over discovery, including those involving 
sanctions, with opposing counsel or pro se litigants before asking 
the court to resolve the dispute. 60 
55. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(l), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see 
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42 (discussing requirement that govemment 
attorneys must offer to exchange certain information at early stage of litigation). 
56. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3641-42; see also Memorandum, supra note 
9, at 6017 (suggesting that agreement between parties, unless local practice warrants other-
wise, should be by consent order to guarantee court enforcement). In ascertaining the practi-
cability of compliance, counsel must consider factors such as the "utility of early issue-
narrowing motions and devices, the scope and complexity of the disclosure that will be re-
quired[, and] the time available to comply with the requirement." Preliminary Memorandum, 
supra note 8, at 3642. 
57. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in l!8 U.S.C. § 519 
(requiring each agency within executive branch to establish coordinated procedure for con-
duct and review of document discovery, including but not limited to review by senior lawyer 
prior to service of request to ensure that request is not cumulative, unreasonable, oppressive, 
or unduly burdensome or expensive given relative importance of issues involved in litigation); 
see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642 (discussing § l (d)(2) governing review 
of proposed document request). 
58. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see 
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642 (noting that document discovery may be 
pursued only after compliance with review procedures). 
59. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(2), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. Com-
pare id. with FED. R. Crv. P. 26(g) (requiring attorney signature on every discovery request as 
certification that request is consistent with rules of civil procedure, is warranted by existing 
law or good faith argument for extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and is not 
unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive given needs of case, previous discovery, 
amount in controversy, and importance of issues at stake). 
60. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 361, reprinted in l!8 U.S.C. § 519 
(requiring both attempt to resolve dispute before petitioning court and that any discovery 
motion concerning dispute be accompanied by representation that attempt at resolution was 
either unsuccessful or impracticable under circumstances); see also Preliminary Memorandum, 
supra note 8, at 3642 (stating that litigation counsel must try to resolve dispute with opposing 
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Section 1 ( e) of the Executive order commands government attor-
neys to introduce only reliable expert testimony.61 The lawyers 
must rely on experts who possess specialized knowledge, have con-
ducted research, or have other expertise in the applicable area and 
who base their determinations on explanatory theories that are ac-
cepted by at least a substantial minority of experts in the field. 62 
Section l(f) of the order covers motions for sanctions.63 Govern-
ment attorneys are to seek sanctions against opposing counsel and 
parties when "appropriate," although government lawyers normally 
must attempt to resolve controversies with the other side before fil-
ing sanctions motions.64 All federal agencies are to designate 
"sanctions officers" who must review proposals of government at-
torneys to request sanctions and motions that litigants file against 
the United States.65 
Section 1 (g) informs government lawyers that they must use effi-
cient case management techniques and undertake reasonable at-
tempts to expedite the resolution of civil lawsuits.66 When proper, 
party, but only if tenns of compromise are reasonable). This requirement parallels the fifth 
guideline of the CJRA. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (Supp. 1992) (listing, among other princi-
ples that district courts may adopt, requirement that discovery motions be accompanied by 
certification that moving party has made reasonable, good faith effort to reach agreement with 
opposing counsel). 
61. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see 
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3642-43 (noting that existing widely used 
practice among government attorneys to use only reliable experts enhances Government's 
position in litigation). A reliable expert is one with substantial knowledge, background, re-
search, or other expertise in a widely accepted field. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, 
at 3642. The requirement of reliable experts is more an evidentiary than a procedural re-
quirement. See PAUL R. RICE, EVIDENCE: COMMON LAW AND FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE 922-
1028 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing general rules and principles applicable to courtroom use of 
expert testimony and scientific evidence). 
62. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(e), 3 C.F.R. at 361-62, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(describing proper use of expert testimony, defining reliable expert testimony, and requiring 
litigation counsel to engage in mutual disclosure of expert witness information to extent other 
party agrees to comparable disclosure); see also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 
3642-43 (delineating elements of reliable expert testimony). 
63. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(f), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see also 
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (discussing§ l(f)). 
64. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (stating that government attor-
neys should pursue sanctions against opposing parties only when there is well-founded basis 
for such action). The order does not define "appropriate" but advises counsel to evaluate 
their opponents' filings and to seek sanctions against "those responsible for abusive prac-
tices." Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l{f), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
65. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l{f), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (re-
quiring submission of motion for sanctions to sanctions officer and requiring that sanctions 
officer be senior supervising attorney within agency who is licensed to practice law before 
state court, courts of District of Columbia, or other territories of United States); see also Pre-
liminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that sanctions officer should be attorney 
with substantial litigation experience and supervisory authority). 
66. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (stat-
ing that these efforts should include, but are not limited to: (I) making reasonable efforts to 
negotiate; (2) narrowing issues by revising pleadings where appropriate; (3) requesting early 
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government counsel are to seek summary judgment to terminate a 
case or narrow the issues to be tried. 67 Government attorneys 
should also attempt to stipulate undisputed facts and seek early trial 
dates when appropriate.6s 
Section 1 (h) instructs government lawyers that they must offer to 
enter agreements providing for two-way fee shifting with their op-
position "to the extent permissible by law."69 Review of relevant 
authority by the Attorney General indicated that no legislation spe-
cifically provided for such agreements.70 Accordingly, the Justice 
Department informed government attorneys that they may not offer 
to enter the agreements until Congress passes authorizing legisla-
tion or the Attorney General provides the requisite authority.7 1 
In addition to section 1 of the order, which is titled "Guidelines 
To Promote Just and Efficient Government Civil Litigation,"72 there 
are nine sections that provide other types of information, most of 
which is less relevant to the issues treated in this Article. Several 
sections are technical. Section 4 provides for Justice Department 
coordination of agency efforts to implement the order's first and 
third sections and empowers the Attorney General to promulgate 
trial date; and (4) moving for summary judgment when motion is likely to prevail); see also 
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (discussing§ l(g) of order and suggesting 
that litigation counsel employ case management techniques in accord with order). 
67. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; see also 
Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that government attorneys should 
not, in pursuit of expedient case management, concede facts or issues that are reasonably in 
dispute, uncertain, or without corroboration). 
68. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g), 3 C.F.R. at 362, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519; Prelimi-
nary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643. 
69. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(requiring that in civil litigation involving disputes over federal contracts pursuant to 41 
U.S.C. §§ 601-613 or in any civil litigation initiated by United States, litigation counsel shall 
offer to enter agreement whereby losing party pays prevailing party's legal fees and costs): see 
also Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (noting that order directs Attorney Gen-
eral to review legal basis for fee-shifting agreements). 
70. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (observing absence oflcgislativc 
authority for fee-shifting agreements). 
71. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643. The Department properly resolved 
this issue. The Supreme Court recently proclaimed that the "allocation of the costs accruing 
from litigation is a matter for the legislature, not the courts." Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. 
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 835 (1990). Moreover, Congress has explicitly rejected two-
way fee shifting while enacting more than 100 statutes prescribing one-way fee shifting. See 
Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. 1, 43 (1985) (appendix to opinion ofBrennan,j., dissenting) (list-
ing fee-shifting statutes enacted by Congress and separating statutes into three categories). 
Justice Brennan found 69 statutes where attorney's fees arc "part of cost"; 49 statutes where 
attorney's fees are not "costs"; and 7 statutes allowing "cost and expenses including attor-
ney's fees." Id.; see also infra notes 83-85 and accompanying text (discussing agencies' duty to 
review proposed legislation or regulations prescribing certain types of fee-shifting 
provisions). 
72. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l, 3 C.F.R. at 360, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
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guidelines.73 Section 5 defines "agency" and "litigation counsel;"74 
section 6 proclaims that the order creates no private rights that are 
enforceable;75 section 7 offers guidance as to the order's scope;76 
section 9 states that the order neither compels nor authorizes the 
disclosure of privileged information;77 and section 10 made the or-
der effective ninety days after October 23, 1991.78 
Section 2 prescribes principles that are intended to foster the pas-
sage of legislation and the promulgation of administrative regula-
tions that do not unduly burden the federal judicial system. 79 The 
section imposes general duties on agencies that are issuing or revis-
ing regulations, developing legislative proposals relating to regula-
73. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 4, 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (in-
structing that guidelines promulgated by Attorney General shaJI serve as models for internal 
guidelines issued by agencies pursuant to order); see also infra notes 86-88 and accompanying 
text (describing § 3 of order, which directs administrative agencies, to extent possible, to im-
plement recommendations of Administrative Conference of United States, as set forth in Case 
Management as a Tool/or Improving Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. §§ 305.86-87 (1991)). 
74. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 5, 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (defining 
"agency" according to definition in 28 U.S.C. § 451, which excludes departments in legisla-
tive and judicial branches and defining "litigation counsel" as trial counsel in U.S. Attorney's 
offices, Special Assistant U.S. Attorneys, litigation division in Department of justice, attorneys 
in agencies authorized to represent themselves, and any private counsel hired to represent 
agency). The final guidance asserts that the definition of "agency" requires "independent" 
agencies to comply with the order because the "President clearly has the authority to super-
vise and guide the exercise of core executive functions such as litigation by government agen-
cies." Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019. This claim is debatable and may implicate the 
Reagan administration's view that the President should have substantial control over the in-
dependent agencies. See Christopher C. Demuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review 
of Agency Rulemaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB Interference with 
Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way To Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1059 (1986); Steve 
Nelson, OMB Should Steer Clear of Independent Agencies, LEGAL TIMES, May 13, 1985, at 2. 
75. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 6, 3 C.F.R. at 365-66, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (pro-
claiming that order does not create any right or benefit, either substantive or procedural, that 
may be enforced by party against United States and proclaiming that order does not obligate 
United States to accept particular settlement or alter standards for accepting settlements). 
76. See id. § 7, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (indicating that order does not 
apply to criminal matters or proceedings in courts outside United States). Moreover, notice is 
not required in numerous specific situations, principaJly when it would defeat the litigation's 
purpose. See id. (stating that notice is not required in any action regarding assets subject to 
forfeiture, or any action to seize property; in any bankruptcy, insolvency, conservatorship, 
receivership, or liquidation proceedings; when assets in question are subject to flight, dissipa-
tion, or destruction; when defendant is subject to flight; or when otherwise impracticable). 
Furthermore, the provisions on ADR and core disclosure do not apply to actions "to seize or 
forfeit assets subject to forfeiture" or to debt coJlection cases involving less than $100 million. 
Id. 
77. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 9, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (noting 
that privileged data includes "sensitive Jaw enforcement information [and] information affect-
ing national security"). 
78. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 10, 3 C.F.R. at 367, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
79. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2, 3 C.F.R. at 363-65, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. Sec-
tions 2, 3 and 8 are Jess technical and have greater relevance to the issues addressed in this 
article and therefore will be treated more thoroughly. Because the notions are not sufficiently 
relevant to warrant extensive examination in the second Part of the Article, some commentary 
on them appears in the foJlowing footnotes. 
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tions, or drafting new legislation. 80 The section charges the 
agencies to review such proposals for drafting mistakes and unnec-
essary ambiguity, to write them in ways that minimize needless liti-
gation, and to draft proposals that prescribe clear and certain legal 
standards for affected behavior and foster simplification and burden 
reduction. 81 
Section 2 enumerates many specific issues that agencies are to 
consider in discharging these general responsibilities. For instance, 
agencies drafting proposed legislation and regulations must make 
all reasonable efforts to guarantee that proposals clearly specify 
their preemptive effect, if any, clearly specify their effect on current 
federal law, if any, clearly specify their retroactive effect, if any, de-
fine their important terms, and provide clear and certain legal stan-
dards for affected conduct. 82 The section also requires agencies to 
review and perform cost-benefit analyses of any proposed legisla-
tion or regulations that permit attorney's fee awards in favor of one 
class oflitigants.83 Agencies must recommend against the adoption 
of fee-shifting provisions when the costs of the provisions signifi-
cantly outweigh any benefits, or when the prescriptions fail to detail 
when awards of costs and fees are proper or to limit such awards. 84 
Whenever agencies submit draft proposals to the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget, the agencies must certify that they have complied 
with the above requirements and justify any departures therefrom.85 
Section 3 prescribes principles that are intended to foster fair and 
efficient resolution of administrative adjudications. 86 The section 
instructs agencies that are adjudicating administrative claims to im-
plement, insofar as is reasonable and practicable, certain recom-
mendations covering case management that the Administrative 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. See id., (stating that legislation should specify or address applicable statutes of limita· 
tion, whether private arbitration is appropriate, whether provisions are constitutionally sever-
able, whether legislation applies to Federal Government, standards for governing assertion of 
personal jurisdiction, and other issues affecting clarity and general drafting standards). These 
general and specific duties may improve the quality of agency drafting efforts, although agen· 
des already have significant incentives to draft the clearest possible proposals. See Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559 (1988) (attempting to bring clarity, definition, and 
predictability to agency activities by requiring, among other things, that certain information 
be made available to public, open meetings, notices of rulemakings, and procedures for im-
plementing proposed rules). 
83. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2(d), 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
84. Id. These requirements could directly affect the expense of litigation. Cf supra note 
71 (describing congressional opposition to fee shifting); i11fra notes 219-21 and accompanying 
text (emphasizing importance of measures aimed directly at cost). 
85. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 2(c), 3 C.F.R. at 364-65, repri11ted i11 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
86. Id. § 3, 3 C.F.R. at 365, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
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Conference has promulgated.87 The Justice Department's final gui-
dance elaborates by encouraging agencies to extend the application 
of relevant components of the order's first section to counsel in ad-
ministrative adjudications. 88 
Section 8 of the order provides that government attorneys are not 
to interpret the order's constituent requirements in ways that con-
flict with the federal civil rules, federal or state law, additional appli-
cable rules of procedure or practice, or court orders.89 The final 
guidance states that government lawyers must comply with both the 
order's provisions and the requirements of "applicable local rules or 
court orders" when they overlap.90 
b. Impl.ementation 
Since January 1992, all counsel who litigate civil cases on behalf of 
the United States Government, including lawyers in federal agen-
cies, the Department of Justice, and the ninety-four local United 
States Attorneys offices, are supposed to have implemented Execu-
tive Order 12,778 and the Justice Department guidance experi-
menting with executive branch reform.91 Several factors complicate 
the effort to ascertain exactly how the United States has effectuated 
the Executive order and the guidelines, however. 
First, government lawyers initially had less than six months to ex-
periment with the order and the preliminary guidance and to submit 
comments on their experiences, and many government attorneys 
may have been uncertain as to how they were to proceed while the 
Justice Department was finalizing the guidelines. Second, there are 
thousands of government counsel with differing responsibilities for 
litigating civil lawsuits. For example, attorneys in applicable divi-
sions of the Justice Department or in the legal offices of numerous 
87. Id.; see also Case Management as a Tool for Improving Agency Adjudication, 1 C.F.R. 
§ 305.86-7 (1992) (recommending that agencies, in both formal and informal acljudications, 
should consider applying case management methods, including personnel management de-
vices, step-by-step time goals, expedited options, case-file systems, two-stage resolution ap-
proaches, mediation, certain questioning techniques, time extension practices, joint 
consideration of cases with common issues, telephone conferences and hearings, intra-agency 
review, and training). 
88. See Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019 (noting that although order does not require 
application of § 1 to agency proceedings, application of relevant sections of order to such 
proceedings is statutorily permissible); see also supra notes 48-71 and accompanying text (ad-
dressing application of§ 1 of order to administrative adjudications). 
89. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § 8, 3 C.F.R. at 366, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519. 
90. Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019. Unfortunately, neither the order nor the gui-
dance treats the more difficult issue of how government lawyers are to resolve conflicts be-
tween the order and other applicable law. Cf infra notes 177-78, 192-96 and accompanying 
text (detailing ways in which order overlaps with other law and explaining administrative ef-
fort needed to disseminate order's requirements to government attorneys). 
91. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3640. 
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agencies may have considerably more responsibility than the local 
United States Attorneys offices for litigating many civil cases on be-
half of the Government. 92 Third, it is very difficult to trace how the 
contents of the order and the guidelines were communicated to all 
government lawyers, how the attorneys understood and imple-
mented them, and what counsel reported to the Justice Department 
regarding their experimentation experiences. Nonetheless, some 
highly generalized information can be derived from the Federal 
Register notice that accompanied and explained issuanc<! of the final 
guidance.93 Additional information can be obtained from interviews 
with Justice Department personnel responsible for finalizing the 
guidance, from interviews with government counsel responsible for 
implementing executive branch reform, and from individuals knowl-
edgeable about civil justice reform. 
These sources indicate that government attorneys have under-
taken minimal implementation of the Executive order and the Jus-
tice Department guidance. Moreover, the efforts to date have been 
sporadic. Attorneys in federal agencies, the Department of Justice, 
and United States Attorneys Offices have varied significantly in 
terms of the rigor and seriousness with which they implemented ex-
ecutive branch reform. There has been greater compliance within 
the Justice Department than among federal agencies and United 
States Attorneys Offices, as might be expected.94 For example, 
although a few United States Attorneys Offices have fully effectuated 
the reform, some have only begun to implement it, and a number 
have taken initial steps, such as instituting training sessions, toward 
implementation. 95 
Experimentation with the different aspects of the reform has also 
varied considerably. For instance, government counsel imple-
mented more broadly and quickly the components of the order that 
92. For instance, the Environment and Natural Resources Division of the Justice Depart-
ment assumes responsibility for much civil litigation involving public lands. E.g., Federal 
Land Policy & Management Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1784 (1988 & Supp. II 1990). The U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers has similar responsibility for certain condemnation proceedings. 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act, § 404(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1344(d) (1988). 
93. Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6015-19. 
94. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, Director of Torts Branch, Civil Division, 
U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. Uan. 29, 1993). 
95. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43. On November 25, 
1991, the Justice Department sponsored a civil justice reform seminar for federal litigators. 
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 
12778 1-89 (Nov. 25, 1991) (setting forth agenda of November 25, 1991 seminar and contain-
ing information concerning civil justice reform, including history and purpose of Executive 
Order 12,778). On February 27, 1992, the Department's Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys 
sponsored "national broadcast training" on civil justice reform. See U.S. DHP'T OF JUSTICE, 
CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IMPLEMENTATION OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 12778 37-47 (Feb. 27, 1992) 
(on file with author) (presenting helpful overview of Order's practical aspects). 
1993] EXECUTIVE BRANCH CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM 1539 
resemble federal procedural rules.96 Government lawyers concomi-
tantly effectuated ADR less widely and promptly because of linger-
ing concern about how best to implement the alternatives. 97 When 
the Justice Department learned of this problem from responses to 
its requests for comments, the Department circulated guidance on 
ADR to government counsel in federal agencies and United States 
Attorneys Offices, who now appear to be more comfortable with the 
concept.98 The above factors suggest that it is too early to ascertain 
the effects, if any, on expense or delay of the reform's imple-
mentation. 99 
The future of executive branch reform remains very much in flux 
because the Clinton administration has not decided whether it will 
retain the reform or, if retained, how the reform will be imple-
mented. President Clinton has left in effect the Executive order that 
President Bush promulgated, but has made no affirmative determi-
nation regarding the reform. 100 This inaction has correspondingly 
led to uncertainty about the reform among government lawyers. 
The former Acting Attorney General, Stuart Gerson, and many Jus-
tice Department personnel considered themselves caretakers and, 
therefore, made little policy in the area of executive branch re-
form.101 The major exception to this was in the area of generic pro-
cedures, such as those prescribing ADR, which seemed sufficiently 
efficacious and apolitical that the Justice Department has continued 
to promote their application.102 
It is too early to ascertain how Janet Reno, the new Attorney Gen-
96. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; see also supra notes 54-60 
and accompanying text (analyzing Executive order components resembling federal proce-
dural rules). 
97. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94; see also supra note 52 and 
accompanying text (indicating that Executive order § l(c) encourages settlement through 
ADR). 
98. Telephone Interview with Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; see also ADR GUIDANCE, 
supra note 31, at 12-14 (setting forth, inter alia, characteristics of cases suitable for ADR and 
procedures for selection of cases for ADR); supra notes 42-46 and accompanying text 
(describing government requests for comments on reforms and government's resulting revi-
sion of preliminary guidance). 
99. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94; Telephone Interview with 
Janice Calabresi, Special Counsel to the Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, U.S. De-
partment of Justice, Washington, D.C. Oune 29, 1992); Telephone Interview with Timothy 
Naccarato, supra note 43. 
100. Telephone Interview with Janice Calabresi, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with 
Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43; cf. Carl Tobias, Litigating with justice: A Civil Agenda, LEGAL 
TIMES, Dec. 28, 1992, at 22 [hereinafter Tobias, Litigating with justice] (suggesting that Clinton 
administration vigorously implement executive branch reform). 
101. Telephone Interview with Janice Calabresi, supra note 99; Telephone Interview with 
Timothy Naccarato, supra note 43. 
102. See ADR GUIDANCE, supra note 31, at 14 (setting forth procedures for selection of 
cases for ADR). 
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eral, will treat executive branch civil justice reform. In an address at 
an April national conference on civil justice reform, Ms. Reno char-
acterized the commitment to the area of civil justice reform as one 
of the most significant that the Justice Department could undertake 
and outlined her approach to the field: 
I want to approach it in a nonpartisan, careful, thoughtful way, 
through the creation in the Department of Justice of something 
akin to the old Office of Justice Improvement, an office where we 
can focus on the issues of civil justice reform without buzz words, 
without labels, and without political debate, looking at what is 
best for the system, looking at issues of alternative dispute resolu-
tion, of case management, of what to do about punitive damages, 
of product liability reforms, of prefiling requirements, and of early 
settlement provisions.103 
2. Legislative proposal 
The Bush administration also proposed legislation covering civil 
justice reform. It based the proposal on the suggestions of the 
Council on Competitiveness Working Group on Civil Justice Re-
form, found in the entity's August 1991 report. 104 On February 4, 
1992, Senator Charles Grassley and Representative Hamilton Fish 
introduced the administration's civil justice reform legislation in 
Congress. 105 
The measure consists principally of procedural requirements re-
sembling those prescribed in or implemented pursuant to the CJRA 
or included in Executive Order 12,778. For instance, one section of 
the bill mandates that a district in every circuit institute a multidoor 
courthouse program for three years. 106 Under this section, the 
courts would have to implement ADR plans that permit parties to 
choose specific techniques for resolving cases without litigation, 
such as arbitration, mediation, early neutral evaluation, and sum-
mary jury trials.101 This prescription, therefore, could essentially 
replicate efforts that numerous EIDCs have already instituted, that 
many of the remaining districts may initiate, and that government 
counsel are currently implementing. 108 Another section of the pro-
103. U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno, Address Before the National Conference on Civil 
Justice Reform (Apr. 21, 1993), available i11 LEXIS, Nexis Library, Federal News Service File. 
104. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVILjUliTICE REFORM IN 
AMERICA 15-27 (Aug. 1991) (providing civil justice reform recommendations). 
105. See S. 2180, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (stating bill's purpose as providing "greater 
access to civil justice by reducing cost and delay"); H.R. 4155, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) 
(same). 
106. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 7; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 7. 
107. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 7; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 7. 
108. See, e.g., supra notes 30-33 and accompanying text (describing EIDCs' civil justice 
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posed legislation mandates that plaintiffs afford potential defend-
ants written notice of their claims and actual damages sought prior 
to filing actions. 109 This stricture mirrors a requirement that the 
Executive order imposes.110 
Additional facets of the legislative proposal, such as the provision 
for fee shifting in diversity cases, are very controversial. 111 In fact, 
the bill is unlikely to pass in 1993, because the proposal includes 
these controversial measures and replicates the CJRA and its imple-
mentation considerably more than the Executive order.112 The de-
feat of the Bush administration and the Clinton administration's 
probable opposition to the bill also suggest that its passage in 1993 
is doubtful.1 13 
II. CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF EXECUTIVE BRANCH CIVIL JUSTICE 
REFORM 
A. A Word About Assessment 
Several difficulties complicate evaluation of the executive branch 
civil justice reform instituted by the Bush administration. First, gov-
ernment attorneys have undertaken only skeletal implementation of 
the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance.114 Effec-
tuation has generally been sporadic and has varied significantly 
reform efforts); supra notes 52, 97 and accompanying text (noting government implementa-
tion of Executive Order 12,778). 
109. S. 2180, supra note 105, § 5; H.R. 4155, supra note 105, § 5. 
110. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text (describing similar requirements in 
§ I (a) of Executive order). 
111. See Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643 (supporting assertion that fee-
shifting provisions are controversial because legislation did not explicitly require such provi-
sions). See generally supra notes 69-71, 84 and accompanying text (explaining government re· 
strictions on implementation of fee-shifting provision). 
112. Compare S. 2180, supra note 105, § 3 (stating that prevailing party is entitled to re-
cover attorneys' fees "only to the extent that such party prevails on any position or claim 
advanced during the action") with Civil justice Reform Act of 1990, 28 U.S.C. § 473 (Supp. 
1992) (promulgating provisions replicated in S. 2180 but without mention offee-shifting pro-
visions) and Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(h), 3 C.F.R. at 362-63, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 
(instructing government attorneys to enter into fee-shifting agreements "to the extent per-
missible by law"). 
113. See Tobias, Clinton Administration, supra note 4, at 443 (describing bill provisions that 
are likely to prevent timely passage). Indeed, Congress failed to schedule a hearing on the 
proposal during 1992. Id. Near the end of Congress' last session, Senator DeConcini intro-
duced a bill to establish a National Commission on Civil Justice Reform. See S. 3333, 102d 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) (proposing national civil justice reform commission to examine and 
develop solutions to civiljustice problems). He intended the proposal to "address the inabil-
ity of the current administration and Congress to develop a comprehensive legislative propo-
sal for civil justice reform." 138 CoNG. REC. S 16,994 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1992) (statement of 
Sen. DeConcini). Senator DeConcini has cosponsored the Civil Justice Reform Act of 1993. 
See S. 585, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (1993). 
114. See supra notes 91-99 and accompanying text (discussing incomplete implementation 
of Executive order). 
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among the Justice Department, the federal agencies, and the ninety-
four United States Attorneys Offices, as well as within the entities' 
different components. 115 These factors indicate that there has been 
virtually no assessment of the efficacy of the procedures by, for ex-
ample, establishing baselines and attempting to ascertain whether 
and how substantially the procedures have reduced litigation ex-
pense and delay.II6 
Even had experimentation been more systematic and uniform, 
and had measures been instituted to evaluate efficacy, those efforts 
would have left untreated the procedures' detrimental side effects, 
namely the potential for less accurate dispute resolution, and signifi-
cant process values, such as fairness and justice, that the CJRA and 
the Executive order expressly mandate be considered. 117 For in-
stance, if resource-poor litigants who were participating in 
mandatory ADR felt compelled, by monetary restraints or by pres-
sure from adversaries or judicial officers, to settle for less than their 
cases were actually worth, the parties' opponents and the courts 
would save money and time, but such savings would be at the liti-
gants' expense in terms of compensation and fairness. 118 
In short, it is problematic to define cost and delay and to analyze 
115. See Carl Tobias, Civil justice Refonn in the Fourth Circuit, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 89, 
110 (1993) (noting that relatively few U.S. Attorneys offices in Fourth Circuit have effectuated 
executive branch reform); Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Axelrad, supra note 94 (noting 
that Torts Branch of Department of Justice Civil Division is fully implementing refonns set 
forth in Executive order); see also supra notes 94-99 and accompanying text (indicating that 
government attorneys generally have been slow to implement reform). 
116. See supra note 99 and accompanying text (noting that because consiswnt implementa-
tion of reform did not occur, it is too early to conduct meaningful evaluation of reform's 
effects); see also Carl Tobias, Recalibrating the Civil justice Refonn Act, 30 HARV.J. ON LEGIS. 115, 
124 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Recalibrati11g the C]RA] (asserting that few districts have estab-
lished expense and delay baselines necessary to measure progress). 
117. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 471 (Supp. 1992) (stating that civil justice plans' purposes arc to 
"ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions"); Exec. Order No., 12,778, 56 Fed. Reg. 
55,195, 55,195 (1991) (propounding order's purpose to "promote fair and prompt adjudica-
tion"); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Costs of Complexity, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466-71 
(1987) (discussing process values); Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE LJ. 1073, 1076-
78 (1984) (discussing process values and criticizing imbalance of power between parties as 
justification for ADR). 
118. This example also implicates the difficult questions of defining and measuring costs 
and determining who bears those expenses. See Tobias, Recalibrati11g the CjRA, supra note 116, 
at 124 (noting that few districts have determined how costs should be defined and allocated 
among parties); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., U11dersta11ding the Plai11tijf's Attorney: T/ie Implications of 
Economic T/ieoryfor Private Enforcemmt of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 669, 677-84 (1986) (arguing that poorer litigants involved in class actions tend to have 
little control over their own cases); Carl Tobias, Rule 11 a11d Civil Rights Litigation, 37 BUFF. L. 
REV. 485, 495-98 (1988-1989) [hereinafter Tobias, Civil Rights] (analyzing difficulties that re-
source-poor litigants confront despite congressional passage of numerous sta1utes suggesting 
that federal courts should be solicitous of litigants' needs). But cf. Carl Tobias, Updati11g Civil 
justice Refonn in Montana, 54 MoNT. L. REV. 89, 95 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Updati11g Civil 
justice Refonn] (providing evidence suggesting that certain repeat players, namely insurers, 
choose state forum out of concern about pressures in settlement conference5). 
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accurately expense and delay reduction. It is even more difficult, 
however, to articulate, measure, and value certain side effects and 
concerns significant to the civil litigation process. Even more com-
plicated is attempting to balance meaningfully all of the considera-
tions that are relevant in determining whether executive branch civil 
justice reform should proceed and, if so, under what circumstances. 
Notwithstanding these problems, it is possible to offer a prelimi-
nary assessment of the Executive order, the Justice Department gui-
dance, and their nascent implementation. This can be achieved 
principally by examining the procedures that are being applied in 
the executive branch effort in light of prior or ongoing experimenta-
tion with the same or analogous procedures. For instance, many 
years before the CJRA's passage, a number of federal judges, partic-
ularly in the Northern District of California, had been experi-
menting with various case management techniques. 119 Similarly, 
numerous courts had been experimenting with certain forms of 
ADR, such as summary jury trials, 120 and judges across the nation 
had been experimenting with court-annexed arbitration.121 
Indeed, Congress relied substantially on this earlier experimenta-
tion when prescribing the eleven principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques in the CJRA, mechanisms that most EIDCs are presently 
implementing. 122 One measure of the executive branch procedures' 
efficacy, therefore, could be whether Congress deemed the proce-
dures sufficiently effective to warrant prescription in the 1990 Act. 
This yardstick is somewhat unrefined because the efficacy of certain 
principles, guidelines, and techniques remains controversial123 and 
because Congress did not consider the enumerated factors to be all-
119. See Robert F. Peckham, The Federal judge as a Case Manager: The New Role in Guiding a 
Case from Filing to Disposition, 69 CAL. L. REV. 770, 779-89 (1981) (evaluating pretrial case man-
agement techniques used in Northern District of California); Judith Resnik, Managerial]udges, 
96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 386-91 (1982) (describing various models of judicial case 
management). 
120. See, e.g., Thomas D. Lambros, The Summary jury Trial and Other Methods of Alternative 
Dispute Resolution, 103 F.R.D. 461, 474-75 (1984) (noting courts' use of summary jury trial as 
cost-saving device). See generally Richard A. Posner, The Summaryjury Trial and Other Methods of 
Alternative Dispute Resolution: Some Cautionary Observations, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 366, 385-89 
(1986) (criticizing summary jury trials as not having positive impact on settlement rates). 
121. See BARBARA s. MEIERHOEFER, COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION IN TEN DISTRICT 
COURTS 13-18 (1990) (discussing ways in which courts have experimented with arbitration 
programs). Congress stamped its imprimatur on this experimentation in the 1988 Judicial 
Improvements Act. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 651-658 (1988) (providing arbitration system for federal 
courts). 
122. See supra note 29 and accompanying text (indicating EIDC implementation of 11 
principles prescribed by Congress). 
123. Some procedures used earlier were and remain controversial. See, e.g., Posner, supra 
note 120, at 385-89 (criticizing summary jury trials). Moreover, a few observers have asserted 
that Congress based the CJRA's procedures substantially on political factors. See Avern Cohn, 
A judge '.r View of Congressional Action Affecting the Courts, LAw & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1991, 
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inclusive. 124 The mere statutory prescription of procedures or prior 
experimentation with those procedures or other measures does not 
necessarily insure that the procedures will reduce expense or delay 
or that they will be free from deleterious side effects or will honor 
important process values. 
In sum, a preliminary assessment of the executive branch proce-
dures can be provided primarily by considering them in light of 
identical or similar mechanisms with which courts have experi-
mented prior to the CJRA's enactment or pursuant to that legisla-
tion. The procedures' efficacy can be evaluated in terms of reducing 
expense, delay, and the detrimental side effects and significant pro-
cess values that the provisions' application implicates. Analysis of 
how specific procedures could prove problematic or effective pre-
cedes a summary by way of general examination. 
B. Specific Procedures 
1. Discovery 
The United States Department of Justice touted the discovery 
provisions as one of the reform's principal components. 125 Many 
attorneys believe that difficulties with discovery, particularly its 
abuse, cause much expense and delay in civil litigation. 126 Chief 
Judge Robert Parker, the Chair of the Judicial Conference Commit-
tee on Court Administration and Case Management, has character-
ized excessive discovery as the "single greatest factor that 
contributes to unacceptable cost." 127 
The requirements pertaining to the disclosure of core informa-
tion are problematic in several respects. 128 Most important, they 
at 99, 103 (concluding that CJRA was "driven by special interests"); see also Mullenix, supra 
note 2, at 396-407 (describing political process from which CJRA evolved). 
124. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) (Supp. 1992) (instructing, in sixth open-ended technique, 
that each court should include in civil justice plan "such other features as the district court 
considers appropriate" after considering its advisory group's recommendations). 
125. See Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6018 (describing reform's discovery component). 
126. See Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Law;•ers About /he 
Sys/em of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. REs.J. 219, 229-35 (describing attorney criticisms 
of discovery process in large cases); William W Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, the Adversary Pro· 
cess, and Discovery Reform, 50 U. Prrr. L. REV. 703, 703 (1989) (stating that "discovery now 
tends to dominate ... litigation and inflict disproportionate costs and burdens"). Bui see 
Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive Discovery Through Disclosure: Is II Again Time for Refon11 ?, 
138 F.R.D. 155, 161 n.33 (1991) (citing authorities in support of proposition that discovery 
abuse is not rampant). 
127. Memorandum on Civil justice Reform Act Implementation from Robert M. Parker, 
Chair,Judicial Conference of the U.S. Committee on Court Administration and Case Manage-
ment, to Chief judges, U.S. Courts of Appeals, Chief judges, U.S. District Courts, and Chairs, 
Advisory Groups (Oct. 22, 1992) (on file with The American University Law Review). 
128. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (describing discovery provisions of Ex-
ecutive order). 
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are less stringent, in terms of what must be divulged and the disclo-
sure's timing, than the strictures that the Federal Rules proposal 
would impose and that numerous EIDCs have implemented pursu-
ant to the CJRA.129 For instance, the executive branch reform re-
quires that parties voluntarily divulge some helpful material, such as 
the names and addresses of potential witnesses and the location of 
relevant documents, during discovery. 130 In contrast, the Federal 
Rules proposal, and a number of courts under the CJRA, call for the 
automatic disclosure of that information, as well as considerably 
more information such as data compilations, damages computa-
tions, and relevant insurance agreements, within thirty days of the 
service of defendant's answer.131 
Even if the executive branch disclosure requirements were more 
demanding, the proviso that they are inapplicable while a dispositive 
motion is pending132 severely undercuts the strictures' effectiveness. 
The United States frequently files questionable motions to dismiss 
that courts do not resolve promptly, often triggering governmental 
requests for discovery stays.133 These developments would suspend 
governmental responsibility to comply while consequently halting 
the progress of cases. 
The above difficulties, principally implicating the efficacy of the 
executive branch disclosure requirements, are compounded by the 
uncertainty surrounding the Federal Rules proposals on which 
many EIDCs premised their prediscovery disclosure procedures. 
Most of the EIDCs relied on the notion that material "bear signifi-
cantly on any claim or defense," which appeared in a 1991 draft; 134 
the rule revisors, however, subsequently replaced that concept with 
the idea of "discoverable information relevant to disputed facts al-
129. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting prediscovery provisions prescribed 
by EIDCs). 
130. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text (discussing discovery section of Execu-
tive order); see also Donj. DeBenedictis, Panel Raps Bush'.r Order, 78 A.B.A.J., Oct. 1992, at 40 
(suggesting that requiring Government to disclose potential witness information is already 
"typical litigation practice" and thus is not substantive reform). 
131. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, supra note 37, at 3-5, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. at 
66-68 (noting information required to be disclosed under proposal). The proposal also im-
poses a continuing duty to update disclosures. Id. 
132. Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(d)(l), 3 C.F.R. 359, 361 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991). 
133. See Letter fromjohn W. Toothman, Esq., Shulman, Rogers, Gandal, Portly & Ecker, 
Alexandria, Va., to Carl Tobias, Professor of Law, University of Montana (Dec. 31, 1992) (on 
file with The American University Law Review) (asserting that order's discovery provision is inef-
fective due to slow resolution of preliminary motions). 
134. SeejUDICIAL CONFERENCE PROPOSAL, supra note 37, at 14, 137 F.R.D. at 87-88 (requir-
ing under rule 26(a)(l)(B) that litigants supply information "concerning documents, data 
compilations, and tangible things ... likely to bear significantly on any claim or defense"). 
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leged with particularity in the pleadings."135 Even though the 
Supreme Court recently approved this formulation, Congress may 
well alter it. 136 
The two other subparts of the Executive order's discovery section 
promise to have no more impact than provision for the disclosure of 
core information. The requirements covering review of proposed 
document requests essentially import discovery strictures that are 
present in current federal rule 26, 137 prescriptions with which gov-
ernment attorneys should already be complying. The order's proce-
dures relating to discovery motions, which require that government 
lawyers make reasonable efforts to resolve discovery disputes with 
adversaries before filing motions and to so state in those papers, 
effectively replicate a measure prescribed in the CJRA 136 that nu-
merous EIDCs have instituted. 139 When these provisions do not re-
solve discovery controversies, the requirements that counsel 
participate in more activities will increase litigation expenses. Mo 
Notwithstanding the above problems, the discovery commands 
could effect some savings of money and time. Insofar as govern-
ment attorneys comply with the strictures regarding disclosure of 
core information to divulge relevant material early in a case, this 
135. 1992 PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 37, at 72; see also supra nou: 37 and accom-
panying text (describing EIDC discovery provisions). 
136. See 61U.S.L.W.4365, 4372-76 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (proposing amendments to Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure). Numerous elements of the organized bar opposed the 1991 
draft, but many constituents believe the new iteration to be an improvement. See Samborn, 
supra note 37, at 12-13 (noting attorney satisfaction with final draft). Nonetheless, some crit-
ics may ask Congress to change the proposal. See infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text 
(noting author's belief that pressure to modify proposals may be exerted). S1•e generally Linda 
S. Mullenix, Hope over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics of Rulemaking, 69 
N.C. L. REv. 795, 801 (1991) (predicting that formulation of new discovery rules will be af-
fected by political pressures); Carl Tobias, Collision Course in Federal Civil Discovery, 145 F.R.D. 
139, 139 (1993) (stating that "procedural reform efforts are on a collision course" due to 
inaction offederal judiciary). 
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b), (g) (providing federal discovery rules for civil cases); see also 
supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text (comparing pertinent federal civil procedure rules 
with proposed Executive order provisions governing discovery). 
138. See 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(5) (1988 & Supp. 1992) (requiring that party moving for dis-
covery motion first make "reasonable and good faith effort" to reach agreement with oppos-
ing party); see also supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting implementation by EIDCs of 
provision requiring efforts to reach agreement between parties before discovery motions will 
be heard). 
139. See, e.g.' U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF MONT., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE ANO DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 17 (Dec. 1991) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN] (establishing new 
discovery procedures for court); supra note 38 and accompanying text (noting other courts' 
adoption of similar approaches). 
140. See Carl Tobias, Civil justice Reform and the Balkanization of Federal Ci'vil Procedure, 24 
ARIZ. ST. LJ. 1393, 1415 (1993) [hereinafter Tobias, Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure] 
(arguing that expediting discovery process may actually increase litigation expenses and cause 
problems for litigants with limited resources). 
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activity may expedite and streamline discovery.141 To the extent 
that these lawyers implement the requirements regarding document 
requests, compliance could both decrease the number of govern-
ment requests and make them more routine and, thus, contribute to 
cost and temporal savings.142 When the strictures on discovery mo-
tions lead to the resolution of discovery disputes, the resources of 
parties and courts will be conserved through a reduction in the 
number of filings.143 
2. Sanctions 
Much of what is included in the Executive order's provision for 
sanctions144 seems unwarranted. Requiring government counsel to 
scrutinize their opponents' papers for deficiencies and seek sanc-
tions when appropriate could unduly emphasize technical niceties in 
pleadings, 145 foster unnecessary satellite litigation, 146 and promote 
incivility among attorneys. 147 These detrimental impacts will in-
crease expense and delay, particularly disadvantaging resource-poor 
litigants. 148 Moreover, the Justice Department had previously fol-
141. I recognize that this is a significant caveat. See supra notes 54-56, 133 and accompa-
nying text (presenting and criticizing Executive order's discovery provision). 
142. See supra notes 57-60, 137 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provi-
sions governing review of proposed document requests and comparing provisions with Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure). 
143. See supra note 60 and accompanying text (discussing Executive order provision re-
quiring attempt by parties to resolve discovery disputes); see also supra notes 138-40 and ac-
companying text (criticizing aforementioned Executive order provision). 
144. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (describing Executive order's sanctions 
provision). 
145. See supra notes 63-65 and accompanying text (presenting Executive order § l(f) re-
quirements, which may lead to unnecessary emphasis on technical wording oflegal motions). 
Such scrutiny and the resulting conflicts over opponents' documents would contravene the 
drafters' intent in adopting original rule 8 that pleading be liberal and flexible. See 
Leatherman v. Tarrant County Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 113 S. Ct. 1160, 
1163 (1993) (holding that federal courts may not employ heightened standard of pleading 
beyond "liberal system of 'notice pleading' set up by the Federal Rules"); FED. R. Crv. P. 
8(e)(l) (stating that "no technical forms of pleadings or motions are required"); see also Rich-
ard L. Marcus, The Revival of Fact Pleading Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 86 CoLUM. L. 
REV. 433, 434-40 (1986) (describing liberal intent of rule 8 drafters). See generally Carl Tobias, 
Public Law Litigation and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 270, 296-301 
(1989) (explaining rule 8 pleading standards). 
146. See, e.g., Eastway Constr. Corp. v. City of New York, 821 F.2d 121, 122-24 (2d Cir.) 
(illustrating how attorney's fee sanctions can lead to satellite litigation), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 
918 (1987); see also Stephen B. Burbank, The Transfonnation of American Civil Procedure: The Ex-
ample of Rule 11, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1925, 1930 (1989) (citing conflicts among circuit courts on 
"practically every important question of interpretation and policy" relating to rule 11 sanc-
tions); Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 514 (noting how rule 11 has "exacerbated," 
rather than cured, litigation abuse). 
147. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 515 (emphasizing ways in which federal 
sanction rules have caused conflicts among attorneys). 
148. See Melissa L. Nelken, Sanctions Under Amended Federal Rule 11-Some "Chilling" 
Problems in the Struggle Between Compensation and Punishment, 74 GEo. LJ. 1313, 1327, 1340 
(1986) (stating that attorneys may be reluctant to bring civil rights suits for fear of being 
1548 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:1521 
lowed a properly measured informal policy of pursuing sanctions 
only in cases of egregious litigation abuse.149 
The Executive order's requirements covering sanctions could be 
less problematic than they appear, depending on how the provisions 
are interpreted and implemented. For instance, government coun-
sel may only request that judges sanction "those responsible for 
abusive practices."150 Although abuse is not defined, the abuse idea 
seems inconsistent with the requirement that papers be scrutinized 
for technical flaws. 151 Courts have experienced difficulty applying 
the abuse concept in the context of sanctions disputes, and use of 
the notion could impose a relatively high threshold and make this 
aspect of the reform resemble the prior justice Department policy 
on sanctions.152 
If the Government were to pursue sanctions vigorously in appro-
priate circumstances, parties and lawyers could be deten·ed from fil-
ing frivolous claims against the United States.153 The strictures on 
sanctions should also serve to make governmental sanctions prac-
tices more consistent and routine. 154 Insofar as government coun-
sel might file unwarranted motions seeking sanctions, the 
procedures provide the safeguard of mandating that attorneys se-
cure approval from specifically designated sanctions officers, 
thereby limiting the potential for "arbitrariness and caprice" which 
might attend government requests for sanctions.155 
3. Expert witnesses 
Certain provisions pertaining to expert witnesses are essentially 
sanctioned if suits are deemed frivolous); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 
F.R.D. 189, 200·02 (1988) (confirming commentators' views that fear of sanctions may lead to 
fewer suits on behalf of poor plaintiffs). 
149. See Carl Tobias, Environmental Litigation and Rule 11, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 429, 460 
(1992) [hereinafter Tobias, Environmental Litigation] (explaining that government attorneys 
only pursue sanctions when opposing party has "seriously abused the litigation process"). 
150. Preliminary Memorandum, supra note 8, at 3643. 
151. See supra note 64 (discussing recommendation in Executive Order rn,778 that attor-
neys evaluate opposing counsels' filings). 
152. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (describing government policy to pursue 
sanctions only in circumstances of extreme abuse); see also William W Schwarzi:r, Rule 11 Revis-
ited, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1015-17 (1988)(citingjudicial difficulty of defining and applying 
abuse standard uniformly). 
153. See Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note 100, at 22 (arguing that Government 
should adopt Executive order provisions, including standards specifying situations in which 
Government should pursue sanctions); see also Schwarzer, supra note 152, at 1017-18 (noting 
that deterrence of frivolous claims was principal purpose of rule 11 's 1983 amendment). 
154. Cf. supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing appointment of "sanctions of· 
ficers" to monitor Government's motions for sanctions). 
155. See DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40 (reporting comments ofform1:r Solicitor Gen· 
era! Kenneth W. Starr); see also supra note 65 and accompanying text (discussing appointment 
of government officers to review sanctions motions). 
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required, are controversial, or could prejudice the United States 
case. 156 For example, the Federal Rules of Evidence effectively al-
low expert testimony only from individuals who possess expertise in 
relevant areas. 157 The mandate that government attorneys present 
in court only reliable expert testimony implicates the heated, un-
resolved debate in the scientific and legal communities over ''junk 
science." 158 Limiting government counsel in this way may also stra-
tegically disadvantage the United States in cases involving signifi-
cant issues of science, technology, public health, and the 
environment. For instance, when the Government seeks to impose 
responsibility for environmental degradation on industry defend-
ants in suits that raise close, complex questions of causation, the 
defendants might be able to call witnesses whom the United States 
could not. The application of these requirements, however, might 
help to resolve some of the controversy that currently surrounds the 
employment of experts and may serve as a model for private liti-
gants and lawyers. For example, restricting government witnesses 
to reliance on widely accepted theories while proscribing contingent 
fees may be instructive experiments that will improve prevailing 
practices in the expert testimony area. 159 
4. Settlement 
The requirements pertaining to settlement in three subsections of 
the Executive order essentially embody good litigation practice or 
correspondingly mandate procedures that government counsel al-
ready follow in most civil cases. 160 The command that government 
lawyers attempt to settle controversies before filing complaints al-
156. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (explaining Executive order provision 
restricting Government's offering of expert testimony). 
157. See FED. R. Evm. 702 (placing restrictions on admissibility of expert testimony); cf. 
Weinstein, supra note 2, at 636-39 (discussing proposed amendments that would strengthen 
rule 702, which governs expert testimony). 
158. See PETER w. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE 2-6 (1991) (describing ''junk science" as 
"speculative theory that expects lawyers, judges, andjuries to search for causes at the fringes 
of science and beyond"); see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 320 
( 1992) (granting certiorari to resolve issues relating to offering of scientific expert testimony). 
159. See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text (describing Executive order's restric-
tions on government use of expert witnesses). The application of certain requirements to 
public interest litigants such as injured individuals or environmental plaintiffs could seriously 
disadvantage them. See john W. Toothman, Agenda to Nowhere: The President's Civiljus-
tice Reforms 6 (1992) (unpublished manuscript on file with The American University Law Review) 
(arguing that proposed reform is "designed to increase the risks to those with limited re-
sources"); see also Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (arguing that narrow applica-
tion of procedural rules has significant impact on civil rights plaintiffs). 
160. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provisions 
already largely followed by government attorneys). 
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ready occurs in many circumstances.161 The notice requirement 
could also prejudice the United States in the smaller number of situ-
ations where potential defendants behave improperly by, for in-
stance, fleeing or destroying relevant documents. 162 
The order's prescriptions on government participation in settle-
ment conferences and concomitantly ADR 163 will be minimally more 
effective than the notice concept discussed in the previous para-
graph. For instance, the Government now actively participates in 
these forms of dispute resolution. 164 Involvement in settlement 
conferences and ADR can disadvantage resource-poor litigants, 
which may include the Government when it is aligned against cer-
tain regulated interests, such as the petroleum industry. 165 Judges 
and parties in settlement conferences may unduly pressure litigants 
with limited funding who might believe that resistance will prejudice 
their cases or lead to sanctions. 166 Participation in these confer-
ences and various forms of ADR can correspondingly deplete par-
ties' scarce resources without moving cases closer to resolution on 
the merits. 167 
The prescriptions covering settlement could effect si~p1ificant ex-
pense and delay reductions for the Government, for lawyers and liti-
gants whom the Government opposes, and for the judiciary. 168 
161. See Toothman, supra note 159, at 4 (noting that government lawyers generally at-
tempt settlement before filing of suit); see also DeBenedic:tis, supra note 130, at 40 (arguing that 
reform is unhelpful because it requires actions that already occur). 
162. See Toothman, supra note 159, at 4 (suggesting that "every practicing lawyer" has had 
client who fled or shredded documents prior to suit). But see supra notes 49, '16 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Executive order provision for situations where notice is not required, 
thus alleviating concerns about defendants who might flee or shred documents). 
163. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text (describing Executive order provisions 
requiring use of settlement conferences and ADR techniques). 
164. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (describing ADR methods already 
largely followed by government attorneys). 
165. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairness and Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in 
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 1359, 1375-83, 1400-04 (describing potential 
prejudices in ADR system and concluding that ADR should be used only when parties are of 
equal economic strength). See generally Kim Dayton, The Myth of Alternative DiJpute Resollltion in 
the Federal Courts, 76 lowA L. REV. 889, 914-28 (1991) (providing critical analysis of ADR); 
Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (describing ways in which inherent characteris-
tics of civil rights cases cause such cases to be adversely affected by forms of ADR). 
166. See supra note 118 and accompanying text (discussing unique burdens ADR places on 
resource-poor litigants); see also Tobias, Environmental Litigation, supra note 149, at 455-56 (not-
ing that government attorneys as repeat players may be reluctant to jeopardize ongoing rela-
tions with judges); supra note 33 and accompanying text (describing court-imposed sanctions 
for litigants who are perceived to have not participated in good faith). 
167. Cf. Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (explaining special challenges faced 
by civil rights litigants). 
168. Cf. supra note 21 and accompanying text (citingjudicial Improvements Act's mandate 
that federal district court advisory groups' recommendations must consider impact of expense 
and delay on judicial system); infra note 205 and accompanying text (suggei:ting that Execu-
tive order's prescriptions reducing expense and delay may cause government attorneys to be 
more receptive to ADR). 
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Requiring that the United States provide notice and attempt to.set-
tle cases before filing, as well as increased participation of the Gov-
ernment in settlement conferences and ADR, may foster earlier 
resolution of a greater number of civil cases, particularly before 
trial. Insofar as these measures' invocation results in more lawsuits 
being terminated sooner in the litigation process, and even outside 
the traditional courtroom procedures, parties, attorneys, and judges 
will realize savings. 
5. Case management 
The Executive order's instructions requesting the employment of 
efficient case management mechanisms and reasonable efforts to ex-
pedite the resolution of civil suits can be criticized for reasons simi-
lar to those regarding settlement and ADR. 169 For example, the 
requirements that government counsel negotiate with other litigants 
and stipulate to undisputed facts, seek early trial settings, and move 
for summary judgment when appropriate are typical litigation prac-
tices.170 Numerous courts have effectively imposed, under federal 
rule 11, the order's command that government lawyers review and 
revise pleadings to reflect information derived from discovery, 171 
although this activity can be expensive and unnecessary. 172 
The Executive order's provision for using efficient techniques of 
case management and making reasonable attempts to expedite civil 
cases could reduce expense and delay.173 For instance, undertaking 
reasonable efforts to agree on facts that are not in dispute, request-
169. See supra notes 66·68 and accompanying text (explaining § 1 (g) of order, which com-
mands government lawyers to seek expeditious resolution of civil lawsuits); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 165-67 (suggesting that settlements and ADR may unfairly pressure re-
source-poor litigants to avoid pursuit of meritorious cases). 
170. CJ. supra notes 67-68 and accompanying text (restating elements of order that in-
struct government attorneys to expedite civil lawsuits); cf. also Toothman, supra note 159, at 7 
(noting ineffectiveness of warning government attorneys to seek early trial dates and narrow 
issues in pleadings, as attorneys often deliberately impede pretrial process). 
171. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 489-501 (documenting judicial enforce-
ment of rule 11 requirements); see also Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(g)(2), 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 
(1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. § 519 (Supp. III 1991) (ordering counsel to review and revise 
papers to guarantee their accuracy and ensure that they reflect narrowing of issues resulting 
from discovery). 
172. See Carl Tobias, Reconsidering Rule JI, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 855, 868-69 (1992) [here-
inafter Tobias, Reconsidering Rule 11] (arguing that proposed rule 11 duty to revise pleadings 
would burden attorneys and parties, add unwarranted expense to litigation, and generally 
complicate lawsuits); see also supra note 145 and accompanying text (suggesting that requiring 
attorneys to inspect their opponents' papers could promote unnecessary emphasis on techni-
cal aspects of. pleadings). 
173. See Tobias, Clinton Administration, supra note 4, at 444 (suggesting that while ultimate 
effectiveness of executive branch civil justice reform remains unclear, certain procedures such 
as mediation, ADR, and participation in settlement conferences could expedite resolution of 
civil litigation). 
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ing early trial dates, and moving for summary judgment to narrow 
the issues may decrease delay and thereby save some expense. 174 
The subsections of the Executive order that were not discussed or 
were treated minimally in the text above warrant little additional ex-
amination here.175 Most of these elements are good litigation prac-
tice, introduce no new requirements, or seem ineffective, and 
impose on government attorneys duties with which they now can, or 
must, comply under the CJRA, federal or local rules, or other proce-
dural requirements. 
C. General Assessment 
1. Inadvisable and less advisable aspects 
One significant problem with executive branch reform is that it 
institutes few procedures that promise to reduce expense or delay 
that judges, lawyers, or litigants could not already invoke, especially 
pursuant to the CJRA, or that are not now good litigation practice 
for most attorneys and parties, particularly the United States and its 
counsel. A side-by-side comparison of the Executive order's re-
quirements and the CJRA's eleven principles, guidelines, and tech-
niques reveals that practically all of the executive branch procedures 
are identical or similar to those listed in the Act, which the ninety-
four districts must consider and may adopt. 176 For instance, the or-
der's provisions for settlement, ADR, and discovery replicate or re-
semble the statutorily prescribed principles, guidelines, and 
techniques. 1" 
Another important difficulty is the significant administrative effort 
that the reform's proper implementation will necessitate. The 
thousands of government lawyers who work in the Justice Depart-
ment, federal agencies, and United States Attorneys Offices must 
174. See infra notes 215, 217-18 and accompanying text (documenting attempts by EIDCs 
to reduce delay and thereby reduce cost of civil litigation). But see infra notes 182-84 and 
accompanying text (noting Justice Department practice of relitigating same substantive legal 
issue in different jurisdictions, thus depleting time and resources of parties). 
175. See supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text (providing brief explanation of Execu-
tive order sections that address technical aspects of reform). 
176. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,778, 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-67 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (containing executive branch civil justice reform prescription) with 28 
U.S.C. § 4 73 (Supp. II 1990) (setting forth statutory plan for reduction of civil litigation ex-
pense and delay). 
177. Compare Exec. Order No. 12,778, §§ l(a)-(d), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprinted ill 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (explaining cost-saving prescriptions of Executive order) with 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(3)-(6) 
(Supp. II 1990) (establishing guidelines for cost reduction and expedition of civil litigation). 
Congress or the rule revisors have rejected several other provisions, such as those governing 
fee shifting and sanctions. See supra note 71 and accompanying text (noting congressional and 
Justice Department rejection of two-way fee shifting); infra text accompanying notes 236-37 
(noting Judicial Conference's intention to limit applicability of rule 11 sanctions). 
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become aware of, understand, comply with, and consistently effectu-
ate the executive branch procedures. This is particularly difficult 
because government counsel, their opponents, and judges will have 
to integrate the strictures with other applicable procedures. 
Those procedures include the requirements appearing in the civil 
justice plans that every district must promulgate by December 1993, 
the existing Federal Rules and Federal Rule proposals (such as 
those governing mandatory prediscovery disclosure) that are sched-
uled to become effective the same month, 178 and the disuniform lo-
cal rules currently applicable in each of the ninety-four districts.179 
Understanding and reconciling these procedures will be especially 
burdensome for Justice Department and agency counsel and their 
adversaries, who typically participate in civil litigation in multiple 
districts. 
2. Advisable aspects 
The executive branch reform would at least require that all gov-
ernment attorneys comply with procedures that could reduce ex-
pense and delay. 180 In many situations, government lawyers have 
few incentives to expedite civil suits. The United States is a defend-
ant in a number of these cases, and adverse decisions will require 
that the Government pay damages, initiate appeals or institute addi-
tional actions with which it disagrees. Delayed resolution can also 
save the United States the money and time that must otherwise be 
expended on pretrial discovery and trying suits. Delay correspond-
ingly affords the Government tactical benefits against parties with 
limited resources who could be dissuaded from vigorously pursuing 
litigation. 
The substantive policies and political perspectives of the presi-
dential administration that is in power can also lead government 
counsel to delay in civil cases. In the administration of President 
Ronald Reagan, for example, government attorneys often raised du-
178. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (discussing Judicial Conference proposal for 
mandatory prediscovery disclosure submitted to Supreme Court in September 1992 and for-
warded by Court to Congress in April 1993). 
179. See COMMrITEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE 
UNITED STATES, REPORT OF THE LOCAL RULES PROJECT: LOCAL RULES ON CIVIL PRACTICE 
(1989) (examining local rules of 94 district courts, identifying inconsistencies among rules, 
and reviewing underlying policies of rules); see also Stephen N. Subrin, Federal Rules, Local 
Rules, and State Rules: Uniformity, Divergence and Emerging Procedural Patterns, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 
1999, 2020-26 (1989) (reporting findings on proliferation and diversity oflocal rules). 
180. See Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note 100, at 22 (suggesting methods Justice 
Department may implement to realize cost-saving and delay-reducing goals of civil justice 
reform); cf. Toothman, supra note 159, at 6-7 (condemning suggestions proposed by executive 
branch designed to expedite civil litigation and reduce expense in civil litigation). 
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bious threshold arguments and invoked procedural technicalities to 
stall civil actions or avoid reaching the merits. 181 A notorious and 
very controversial example was the Reagan administration's reliance 
on the questionable idea of nonacquiescence. 182 Even after one, or 
numerous, appeals courts had ruled against the United States on a 
substantive legal issue, the Justice Department would persist in relit-
igating that question in other circuits. 183 The Government only in-
frequently persuaded these courts, thus wasting valuable time and 
resources of the parties, the Government, and the courts. 184 
In numerous civil cases, the United States has found reasons not 
to expedite the disposition of suits and has had substantial incen-
tives to delay resolution. 185 Justice delayed can be justice denied in 
a very real sense, especially for resource-poor litigants such as in-
jured individuals. 186 The executive branch reform may positively af-
fect some of the incentives that motivate government counsel and 
could encourage them to reduce cost and delay. 
Although the executive branch reform implements very few pro-
cedures that are not already available, 18 7 the reform would affirma-
tively require all government lawyers to satisfy certain strictures 
intended to decrease expense and delay. The procedures' nation-
wide scope means that they would apply to government attorneys in 
each of the ninety-four districts, 188 many of which include courts 
181. See Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note l 00, at 22 (noting delayinE:tactics of Presi-
dent Reagan's Civil Division, including invocation of dubious standing challenges and auto-
matic, questionable motions to dismiss); see also Toothman, supra note 159, at 7 (maintaining 
that government attorneys often delay pretrial process through excessive filing of motions 
and answers). 
182. Nonacquiescence refers to the refusal of federal agencies to conform their decisions 
to adverse rulings of the courts of appeals. E.g., Samuel Estreicher & Richard L. Revesz, 
Nonacquiescence by Federal Administrative Agencies, 98 YALE LJ. 679, 692-713 (1989) (examining 
agencies' practice of selectively refusing to apply judicial precedent); see, e.g., Borton, Inc. v. 
Occupational Safety and Health Review Comm'n, 734 F.2d 508, 510 (10th Cir. 1984) (noting 
OSHRC's challenge to meaning of statutory language that was declared unambiguous in pre-
vious litigation); Yellow Taxi Co. of Minneapolis v. NLRB, 721 F.2d 366, 382-83 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (admonishing NLRB for intentional defiance of established judicial precedent); Alle-
gheny Gen. Hosp. v. NLRB, 608 F.2d 965, 966 (3d Cir. 1979) (reviewing NLRB order that 
conceded applicability of established precedent but refused to follow it). 
183. See Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note 100, at 22 (noting Government's practice 
of relitigating legal issues in jurisdictions that had not resolved those issues). 
184. See Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note 100, at 22 (noting that practice was espe-
cially pernicious in litigation involving public entitlements, such as social s1:curity disability 
payments). 
185. Tobias, Litigating with justice, supra note 100, at 22. 
186. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (recognizing disparity in litigation 
resources between poor, uneducated plaintiffs and well-financed and fully staffed Govern· 
ment); cf. H. Lee Sarokin, justice Rushed Is justice Ruined, 38 RUTGERS L. REV. 431, 431-34 
(1986) (recognizing abuse of case expedition methods at expense of injured litigants). 
187. See supra note 177 and accompanying text (observing similarities between executive 
branch civil justice reform proposals and methods adopted by CJRA). 
188. This would be important because numerous government lawyers have not always 
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that may not incorporate all of these requirements in their civil jus-
tice plans.189 Moreover, mandating that every government counsel 
comply with the strictures imposes affirmative obligations on the 
lawyers, rather than demanding that other attorneys, litigants, or 
federal judges activate the procedures.190 
Even though implementation of the executive branch reform will 
be a significant administrative undertaking, 191 it is less substantial 
than many similar duties routinely discharged by the Government. 
An apt example is the annual need to communicate to all govern-
ment lawyers applicable changes in the Federal Rules of Evidence 
and Civil, Criminal, and Appellate Procedure.192 Moreover, a small 
expenditure of resources today that reduces expense and delay in 
the long term may be a worthwhile investment. 
Insofar as implementation of executive branch reform entails rec-
onciliation of increasingly inconsistent federal civil procedures, the 
Executive order contributes only minimally to conflicts and prov.ides 
relevant guidance for resolving some anticipated difficulties. 193 In-
deed, the fact that numerous executive branch procedures resemble 
present procedural requirements actually affords certain benefits.194 
The procedural similarities reduce inconsistency and facilitate com-
pliance because many lawyers, litigants, and judges are already fa-
miliar with existing strictures. Furthermore, primary responsibility 
for treating these complications either belongs with other entities, 
such as the individual districts, 19 5 or has been assigned to additional 
instrumentalities, such as Circuit Judicial Councils.196 
litigated civil cases in ways that reduce expense and delay. See supra text accompanying notes 
180·86 (discussing delaying practices employed by government attorneys). 
189. Even the popular mandatory prediscovery disclosure procedure was adopted by only 
a slight majority of the EIDCs. See supra note 37 and accompanying text (noting EIDCs that 
employed mandatory prediscovery disclosure rules). See generally Tobias, judicial Oversight, 
supra note 24, at 51 (observing that district courts have employed different procedures gov-
erning mandatory discovery disclosure). 
190. It is important to impose affirmative obligations, such as moving for settlement con-
ferences, on government lawyers because of their past litigation practices. See supra text_ ac-
companying notes 180-86 (documenting methods used by government attorneys to delay civil 
actions). . 
191. See supra text accompanying notes 176-79 (discussing anticipated difficulties in ad-
ministration of civil justice reform). 
192. See 28 U.S.C. § 2074 (1988) (prescribing procedures governing rules' adoption). 
193. See supra text accompanying note 176 (noting order's minimal contribution to ex-
isting prescriptions); see also Memorandum, supra note 9, at 6019 (providing guidance for 
resolving problems of overlapping procedures). 
194. See supra text accompanying notes 176-77 (observing similarity between existing pro-
cedures and executive branch guidelines). 
195. See 28 U.S.C. § 207l(a) (1988) (ordering districts not to adopt local rules that con-
flict with Federal Rules or provisions of U.S. Code). 
196. See 28 U.S.C. § 332(d)(4) (1988) (providing that councils may modify or abrogate 
inconsistent local rules). 
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The Executive order would also increase consistency in the way 
that the thousands of government lawyers handle civil litigation. 
For instance, requiring senior government attorneys to review re-
quests for document discovery and sanctioning activity in civil cases 
involving the United States should help to regularize governmental 
practices in these areas.197 
It is important to remember that executive branch reform is a nas-
cent effort to decrease expense and delay in civil suits and that re-
form efforts can be improved in accordance with the suggestions 
offered in the third Part of this Article. 198 For example, government 
lawyers may interpret and implement the entire reform and specific 
procedures in ways that enhance their ability to reduce expense or 
delay. 199 When certain measures prove to be less effective, the 
problems that they pose could be amenable to amelioration. In 
short, the Government might treat the reform's effectuation as an 
ongoing experiment in which the general approach and particular 
procedures can constantly be evaluated and calibrated as experience 
accumulates. 
The executive branch reform, therefore, may enable government 
civil litigation to serve as a laboratory for experimentation with new 
procedures or with mechanisms that are not being broadly used.200 
For instance, the implementation and employment of requirements 
relating to settlement, ADR, and efficient case management might 
illustrate ways of saving money or time that warrant widespread ap-
plication, while ongoing experimentation may even lead to the in-
vention of innovative techniques.201 The reform could also realize 
former President Bush's expressly declared goal of having the 
197. See supra text accompanying notes 57-60, 63-65 (discussing § § 1 (d)(2)-(3) and 1 (f) of 
order, which provide guidelines for discovery and sanctions). 
198. See infra text accompanying notes 210-44 (urging Clinton administration to imple-
ment vigorously executive branch guidance and suggesting strategies for employing civil jus-
tice reform). 
199. The lawyers could generously read and apply the procedures covering core disclo-
sure. See infra text accompanying note 210 (suggesting that voluntary mutual exchange of 
relevant information would expedite discovery). They might also pursue a cautious sanctions 
policy. See Tobias, Environmental Litigation, supra note 149, at 460 (relating justice Department 
policy of pursuing sanctions only in cases of severe abuse of litigation process); infra text 
accompanying note 211 (urging executive branch to pursue reasoned and moderate sanctions 
policy). 
200. See generally A. Leo Levin, Local Rules as Experiments: A Study in the Divi1ion of Power, 139 
U. PA. L. REV. 1567, 1579-94 (1991) (suggesting that inconsistent local rules of civil proce-
dure provide opportunity to test various methodologies in pursuit of most efficacious proce-
dural framework); Laurens Walker, Perfecting Federal Civil Rules: A Proposal for Restricted Field 
Experiments, l..Aw & CoNTEMP. PRoBs., Summer 1988, at 67, 75-84 (suggesting adoption of 
national and geographically restricted field experiments to evaluate effectiveness of Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure). 
201. When specific procedures prove particularly efficacious, they probably should be em-
bodied in the Federal Rules and applied nationwide. See Tobias, Recalibrating the Cf RA, supra 
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United States set "an example for private litigation by adhering to 
higher standards" than those required by current procedural 
rules.202 Former Solicitor General Kenneth W. Starr characterized 
the endeavor as an "effort to change the culture of federal litigation 
at the behest of the federal government,"203 perhaps intimating that 
modifications in attitudes might effect real change.204 For example, 
the reform may make government attorneys, many of whom under-
standably assumed their present posts because they wished to try 
cases, more receptive to ADR.2os 
Finally, it is especially important at this peculiar moment in the 
history of the federal courts to initiate efforts that could reduce ex-
pense and delay in civil litigation. The federal judiciary is in serious 
financial straits, attempting to operate effectively with a budget that 
is $370 million less than was requested.20s Additional support for 
experimentation that might decrease cost and delay appears in the 
purported reasons for the CJRA's passage, namely, the increasing 
expense of resolving civil disputes, the shrinking access to federal 
courts, and growing litigation abuse.20' 
note 116, at 130 n.75 (suggesting systemwide application of civil justice reform procedures 
that have proven most effective subsequent to EIDC experimentation). 
202. Exec. Order No. 12,778, pmbl., 3 C.F.R. 359, 359-60 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991). 
203. DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40. 
204. See DeBenedictis, supra note 130, at 40 (reporting opinions, provided at annual meet-
ing of ABA, on former President Bush's Executive order commanding government lawyers to 
reduce civil litigation and delay). These public officials' views are considerably more sanguine 
than those of numerous other observers who see the reform as a modest effort. Id.; see also 
Mullenix, supra note 2, at 387-88 (noting that executive branch contributes few novel ideas to 
civil justice reform movement); Cohn, supra note 123, at 100 (expressing doubt about efficacy 
of procedures prescribed in CJRA). 
205. This is premised on conversations with Justice Department personnel responsible for 
coordinating executive branch reform and with other individuals familiar with civil justice 
reform. 
206. See Don]. DeBenedictis, Tight Budget Squeezes Courts, A.B.A.J., Dec. 1992, at 22, 22-24 
(reportingjudiciary budget cuts for fiscal year beginning October 1, 1992); Eva M. Rodriguez, 
Federal Courts Face Year of Living Frugally, LEGAL TIMES, Oct. 5, 1992, at 1 (reporting that fed-
eral judiciary faces unprecedented systemwide budget cuts in 1993); see also Judiciary Appro-
priations Act, Pub. L. No. 102-395, 106 Stat. 1828, 1856-59 (1993) (allocating salary, fee, and 
expense funds to federal judiciary). 
207. See 28 U.S.C. § 471(Supp.II1990) (stating that purposes of statutorily required civil 
justice expense and delay reduction plans are "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil 
cases on the merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, 
speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil disputes"). I recognize that these ideas and, in-
deed, the CJRA's passage are controversial. See, e.g., Mullenix, supra note 2, at 379 (describing 
CJRA as "a revolutionary redistribution of the procedural rulemaking power from the federal 
judicial branch to the legislative branch"); Cohn, supra note 123, at 99-103 (criticizing CJRA); 
see also Lauren K. Robel, The Politics of Crisis in the Federal Courts, 7 OHIO ST.j. ON D1sP. RESOL. 
115, 115 (1991) (characterizing dispute over CJRA as intense and acrimonious). 
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D. Transition by Way of Resolution 
In sum, the Executive order and the Justice Department guidance 
provide comparatively few procedures that judges or parties cannot 
presently invoke, principally under the CJRA. A small number of 
the requirements promise to reduce expense or delay signifi-
cantly, 2os and some strictures apparently will be ineffective, costly, 
or difficult to implement.209 Nonetheless, the executive branch re-
form imposes on all government attorneys who litigate civil cases 
certain requirements that could decrease expense or delay. More-
over, the serious fiscal and other restraints that the federal judiciary 
increasingly confronts and the rising cost of civil litigation for many 
parties and lawyers emphasize the need to institute efforts that 
might reduce expense and delay. On balance, therefore, the general 
approach embodied in the order and the guidelines and the specific 
procedures included therein appear promising enough to warrant 
vigorous implementation, continued experimentation, rigorous as-
sessment, and exploration of how the reform might be improved 
through refinement or elaboration. 
Ill. SUGGESTIONS 
The Clinton administration should treat executive branch reform 
as a nonpartisan effort that could benefit all parties and lawyers who 
participate in federal litigation and the federal judiciary. It should 
vigorously effectuate the Executive order and Justice Department 
guidance that the Bush administration promulgated while rigor-
ously analyzing the executive branch experimentation that occurs. 
Vigorous implementation should proceed pursuant to certain 
ideas included in the second Part of this Article. For instance, the 
Government ought to interpret generously the requirements gov-
erning disclosure of core information and promote the voluntary 
mutual exchange of the maximum relevant information as early in 
the litigation as practicable.210 The United States should also seek 
208. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 141-43 (commenting that discovery provi-
sions may save time and money); supra text accompanying notes 153-55 (suggesting that sanc-
tions guidelines, if properly applied, could deter frivolous claims and make sanctions practices 
more consistent and routine); supra text accompanying note 168 (noting that settlement pro-
cedures could reduce expense and delay by encouraging early resolution of lawsuits). 
209. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 125-40 (suggesting that discovery disclosure 
rules could increase expense oflitigation); supra text accompanying notes 144-49 (noting that 
sanctions provisions could increase cost and delay and promote incivility among litigators); 
supra text accompanying notes 163-67 (commenting that rules urging settlement of disputes 
might eliminate meritorious claims). 
210. See supra text accompanying note 141 (suggesting that compliance with procedures 
regarding disclosure of core information will expedite discovery). 
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to foster widespread use of experimentation with settlement confer-
ences and ADR while pursuing an appropriately balanced sanctions 
policy. 211 Rigorous assessment would entail the establishment of 
baselines to permit the accurate measurement of any expense and 
delay reduction that the employment of certain procedures effects 
and the careful collection, analysis, and synthesis of empirical data 
showing such decreases.212 
Vigorous implementation and rigorous evaluation do not neces-
sarily mean that all of the procedures must be fully effectuated in 
every federal district and be subjected to searching scrutiny. In-
deed, such an approach could be expensive and difficult to adminis-
ter, inhibit careful experimentation and assessment, and even prove 
counterproductive. The preferable course of action, therefore, 
would be a narrower approach. The Clinton administration should 
implement and evaluate a sufficient number of procedures in 
enough districts with adequate rigor to afford representativeness, 
some statistical validity, and a sense of efficacy. The administration 
may want to designate certain districts in which it would vigorously 
effectuate and rigorously analyze specific procedures. For instance, 
the administration might emphasize the use of ADR in the three 
courts that the CJRA designates as demonstration districts: the 
Northern District of California, the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia, and the Western District of Missouri.213 These courts are to 
experiment with various expense and delay reduction techniques, 
including ADR, and the Judicial Conference is to study this imple-
mentation and submit a report to Congress.214 
The Clinton administration should undertake a systematic effort 
to identify the most efficacious procedures for decreasing cost and 
delay. In addition to evaluating rigorously executive branch reform, 
the administration should consult numerous other sources. The ad-
ministration ought to monitor closely activity under the CJRA. It 
should scrutinize the civil justice plans developed in the thirty-four 
EIDCs for procedures that appear promising, such as the reliance of 
several courts on the setting of early, firm trial dates21 5 and on co-
211. See supra notes 149, 152 and accompanying text (lauding government sanctions pol-
icy as reasonable and suggesting that proper implementation of Executive order requirements 
would perpetuate appropriate utilization of sanctions); supra text accompanying note 168 
(contending that increased government participation in settlement conferences and ADR will 
promote expeditious resolution of civil suits). 
212. See supra text accompanying note 116 (noting absence of measure for determining 
efficacy of civil justice reform prescriptions). 
213. 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 1990). 
214. Id. 
215. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF IDAHO PLAN, supra note 37, at 3 (stating that firm trial dates are 
necessary to promote economic efficiency, and requiring that cases be set for trial at "earliest 
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equal assignment of civil cases to Article III judges and magistrate 
judges.216 The administration should also examine the annual as-
sessments that the EIDCs have prepared or are compiling, such as 
the evaluation of the ADR program instituted in the Western Dis-
trict ofMissouri,217 and the civiljustice plans that the remaining dis-
tricts must adopt by December 1993.21s 
One important focus should be mechanisms that frontally attack 
the costs of litigation. Most EIDCs have primarily attempted to re-
duce delay and thus indirectly limit expense.219 The Eastern Dis-
trict of Texas is one court that implemented measures aimed 
directly at cost, such as imposing ceilings on contingent fees and 
establishing innovative requirements governing settlement offers.220 
The extent of discovery is another difficulty that needs special atten-
tion because it contributes significantly to unacceptable expense. A 
number of EIDCs have imposed strict temporal or numerical limits 
on discovery.221 These restrictions may afford insufficient flexibility 
practicable time"); DISTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 14 (requiring establishment 
of firm, certain trial dates and expedited trial docket); U.S. DIST. CoURT FOR 111E D1sT. OF OR., 
CIVILjUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN 4 (Dec. 30, 1991) [hereinafter DISTRICT OF 
OREGON PLAN] (promoting establishment of firm trial dates). 
216. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 3-4 (providing guidelines for 
assigning cases to judicial officers); DISTRICT OF OREGON PLAN, supra note 215, at 20 (provid-
ing that civil cases will be assigned to full-time magistrates and district judges on co-equal 
basis); see also U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF ARK., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 3 (Dec. 30, 1991) (providing that civil cases will be randomly assigned to 
district judges and magistrate judges on experimental basis); Tobias, Balkanization of Federal 
Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1421-22 (reporting additional procedun!s developed by 
EIDCs, including ongoingjudicial management programs and requirements that persons with 
binding authority attend settlement conferences). 
217. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEW. DIST. OF Mo., ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE EARLY AS-
SESSMENT PROGRAM 6-12 (Jan. 26, 1993) (describing ADR program's options and procedures 
and requiring ongoing evaluation to determine success of program); see alsa supra notes 33, 
215 and accompanying text (discussing annual assessments of demonstration districts estab-
lished by CJRA); U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THE DIST. OF NJ., ANNUAL AssESSME.NT OF THE CIVIL 
JUSTICE ExPENSE AND DELAY REDUCTION PLAN FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CIVILjUSTICE RE-
FORM ACT OF 1990 38-39 (Dec. 22, 1992) (modifying procedures to use judicial resources 
more effectively). 
218. See supra text accompanying note 16 (explaining CJRA requirement that federal trial 
courts establish expense and delay reduction programs by December 1993); see also supra note 
27 and accompanying text (predicting that some courts will employ expense and delay reduc-
tion plans prior to statutorily imposed deadline). 
219. See supra text accompanying notes 24-33 (discussing efforts of EIDC!: to reduce delay 
by encouraging settlement and ADR). 
220. See EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS PLAN, supra note 28, at 7-8, 10 (limiting contingent 
fees in nonstatutory cases to 33.3% of total award or settlement and devising settlement pro-
cedure that requires parties who reject reasonable settlement offers to pay their opponents' 
litigation costs in certain circumstances). 
221. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS PLAN, supra note 29, at 35 (limiting discovery 
practice of individual parties or groups of parties that share common interei:t to five deposi-
tions, 30 interrogatories, and two requests for production); EASTERN D1sTRIGT OF NEW YORK 
PLAN, supra note 32, at 7 (suggesting presumptive discovery limitation of 15 interrogatories 
and IO depositions per side). 
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in complex cases or in suits where plaintiffs need considerable dis-
covery to prove their cases. 222 
The Clinton administration should not confine the search for 
new, efficacious procedures to the CJRA and its implementation, 
but should broadly explore numerous possibilities. For example, 
the twenty districts that are currently experimenting with court-an-
nexed arbitration pursuant to the 1988 Judicial Improvements Act 
could yield helpful information. 223 The administration should also 
examine and be receptive to the type of experimentation in specific 
courts that anticipated the CJRA, 224 although much of the earlier 
experimentation has probably been subsumed under the Act.225 It 
might similarly consider certain case management techniques that 
the Eastern District of Virginia has successfully employed to main-
tain a current docket and early trial dates, even as the court effec-
tively eschewed reliance on the CJRA. 226 
Valuable repositories of information on much of this efficacious 
activity are the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
and the Federal Judicial Center. All of the entities that Congress 
charged with responsibility for oversight or study of the CJRA's im-
plementation, such as circuit review committees, the Judicial Con-
ference, and the RAND Corporation, 221 should also be helpful 
222. See Tobias, Civil Rights, supra note 118, at 495-98 (noting that inherent characteristics 
of civil rights cases often require extensive discovery). See generally Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable 
justice: The Form of Complex Litigation and the Limits of judicial Power, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1683, 
1809-11 (1992) (discussing court-imposed limitations on scope of discovery in cases entailing 
complex litigation). 
223. See supra note 121 and accompanying text (discussing nationwide experimentation 
with court-annexed arbitration). 
224. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text (noting judicial experimentation with 
various case management techniques and ADR). 
225. The experimentation probably is proceeding pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 473(b)(6) 
(Supp. II 1990). See Tobias, Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1420-22 
(describing nonuniform experimental procedures implemented by various districts pursuant 
to § 473(b)(6), which permits districts to adopt procedures not specifically authorized by 
CJRA subsequent to advisory group recommendation). 
226. See U.S. DIST. COURT FOR THEE. DIST. OF VA., CIVIL JUSTICE EXPENSE AND DELAY 
REDUCTION PLAN 1-2, 9-13 (Dec. 16, 1991) (noting that court already employs, or is experi-
menting with, many of case management techniques recommended by CJRA, including early 
involvement by judicial officer, mandatory pretrial conferences, and cooperative discovery; 
and rejecting as unnecessary other recommendations, including requiring attendance of rep-
resentatives with authority to bind party at initial pretrial conference, requiring parties to sign 
requests for continuances, and standardization of pretrial orders). See generally Kim Dayton, 
Case Management in the Eastern District of Virginia, 26 U.S.F. L. REV. 445, 449-87 (1992) (describ-
ing effective and efficient case management practices of Eastern District of Virginia). 
227. See Tobias, Balkanization of Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1406-11 (explain-
ing role of circuit review committees and Judicial Conference concerning CJRA implementa-
tion and suggesting that oversight responsibilities assigned by Congress are unclear and 
foster complex and disuniform rules in various districts). The RAND Corporation is prepar-
ing the "program study report" on the pilot program. See 28 U.S.C. § 471 note (Supp. II 
1990) (requiring that "independent organization with expertise in the area of Federal court 
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sources of material. The Clinton administration may want to set 
early 1994 as a target date by which to decide whether and, if so, 
how to modify the Executive order and the Justice Department gui-
dance. The administration should be able to make well-informed 
determinations by that time.22s 
The Clinton administration, when treating the Executive order 
and Department of Justice guidelines, should delete any procedures 
that have proved unworkable, confusing, or ineffective in reducing 
expense and delay. The administration should also eliminate proce-
dures whose disadvantages outweigh their benefits, especially those 
that impose detrimental side effects or threaten important process 
values. The administration could draw, for instance, on experimen-
tation with executive branch reforms in the EIDCs, which might be 
documented in their annual assessments. Those requirements in 
the Executive order and the accompanying guidance covering notice 
before filing, discovery disputes, use of expert witnesses, and gov-
ernmental participation in ADR may operate inefficiently, impose 
unnecessary costs or delays, or even strategically prejudice the 
United States.229 
In contrast, the Clinton administration should add to the Execu-
tive order and the Justice Department guidance any techniques that 
clearly have decreased or promise to reduce expense or delay. The 
administration could rely, for example, on experience in the EIDCs, 
executive branch experimentation, or innovative measures included 
in the civil justice plans that the non-EIDCs develop or that the ad-
management" conduct study of pilot program for report submitted by Judicial Conference to 
Congress). 
228. There will be at least a year's worth of experience with executive branch reform that 
the administration can use to assess and modify civil justice reform procedures. By 1994, 
nearly all of the EIDCs will have completed one annual assessment, and some will have com· 
piled a second. See supra note 217 and accompanying text (describing annual assessments 
prepared by various EIDCs). Courts that are not EIDCs will have adopted civil justice plans 
by December 1993, as required by the judicial Improvements Act of 1990. See supra text ac· 
companying note 218 (urging administration to examine non-EIDC civil justice plans). Fed-
eral Rules amendments, especially those governing sanctions and discovery, will also have 
become effective. See infra text accompanying notes 232-34 (discussing Federal Rules amend-
ments that become effective in December 1993). 
229. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text (recognizing that requiring counsel to 
engage in additional activity to resolve discovery disputes will increase litigation costs); supra 
text accompanying notes 156-59 (arguing that limiting use of expert witnesses coulc! impede 
government litigation in areas of science, technology, public health, and environment); supra 
text accompanying note 162 (suggesting that notice requirements could induce defendants to 
flee or destroy evidence); supra text accompanying notes 163-67 (noting that ADR can deplete 
parties' resources and disadvantage resource-poor litigants). See generally Tobias, Balka11izalion 
of Federal Civil Procedure, supra note 140, at 1426 (suggesting that by expanding litigation re-
sponsibilities and making it more difficult to reach merits of disputes, certain aspects of civil 
justice reform such as ADR and managerial judging could lead to greater expense and delay 
in civil litigation). 
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ministration discovers in broadly exploring novel procedures. Cer-
tain mechanisms that some districts have employed to expedite the 
resolution of specific types of government litigation, such as social 
security appeals and student loan cases, may prove efficacious and 
could warrant national application. 23° 
The Clinton administration should designate those procedures in 
the Executive order and Department of Justice guidelines that are 
not clearly efficacious or are ineffective in reducing expense and de-
lay. For instance, it may be too early to ascertain definitively 
whether governmental participati0n in particular forms of ADR, 
such as mediation or summary jury trials, decreases cost or delay.231 
The administration should leave in effect those provisions the effi-
cacy of which remains uncertain, ought to continue vigorously ex-
perimenting with the procedures, and should rigorously evaluate 
them. 
The Clinton administration will also need to conform the require-
ments in the order and the guidance to applicable Federal Rules 
amendments, which will become effective in December 1993. The 
revisions governing mandatory prediscovery disclosure, principally 
under rule 26, and sanctions pursuant to rule 11 now appear most 
relevant232 because Congress probably will resist the considerable 
pressure that may be exerted233 to modify proposals that would 
amend rules recently submitted to it by the Supreme Court. 234 
If the requirements covering compulsory prediscovery disclosure 
take effect as currently drafted, they could preempt the order's pro-
230. See, e.g., DISTRICT OF MONTANA PLAN, supra note 139, at 34 (mandating expedited 
procedures for certain cases, including federal debt-collection and forfeiture actions); DIS-
TRICT OF OREGON PLAN, supra note 215, at 11 (providing special scheduling procedures for 
Social Security cases). 
231. See supra notes 52, 98 and accompanying text (discussing ADR and its use by govern-
ment attorneys); see also 28 U.S.C. § 473(a)(6) (Supp. II 1990) (providing CJRA's ADR 
prescription). 
232. See supra notes 37, 136 and accompanying text (discussing prediscovery disclosure); 
infra text accompanying notes 236-38 (addressing issue of sanctions according to Executive 
order, rule 11, and Justice Department policies). 
233. See supra note 136 and accompanying text (noting opposition to section of 1991 draft 
of Federal Rules concerning prediscovery disclosure); see also George Cochran, Bench-Bar Alter-
native for Rule 11, NAT'L LJ., Aug. 17, 1992, at 15-16 (discussing controversy over proposed 
rule 11 amendment scheduled to take effect in December 1993); Carl Tobias, Civil Rights 
Plaintiffs and the Proposed Revision of Rule 11, 77 lowA L. REV. 1775 (1992), [hereinafter Tobias, 
Proposed Revision] (finding present rule 11 draft solicitous of civil rights plaintiffs who are dis-
advantaged and detrimentally affected by 1983 revision of rule). 
234. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993); see also Letter from L. Ralph Mecham, 
Director, Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts, to the Chief Justice of the United States 
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court 1 (Nov. 27, 1992) (on file with The American 
University Law Review) (reproducing Judicial Conference transmittal to Supreme Court of pro-
posed amendments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure). 
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visions governing disclosure of core information. 235 Were the re-
vised rule 11 to become effective as presently written, the order's 
requirements respecting sanctions might not violate the letter, but 
could well contravene the spirit, of the amended rule.236 For in-
stance, the rule revisors modified rule 11 in several important ways 
that evince clear intent to reduce the rule's invocation signifi-
cantly.237 The administration could more closely align the order 
with this fundamental purpose by reinstituting the Justice Depart-
ment's properly tempered policy of seeking sanctions only for se-
vere litigation abuse or by at least deemphasizing the requirement 
that government counsel scrutinize all of their opponents' filings for 
evidence of sanctionable activity. 23s 
One of the Clinton administration's most difficult tasks will be re-
fining the retained executive branch requirements in ways that will 
facilitate governmental efforts to decrease expense and delay. Ex-
press and implicit suggestions for improvement appear throughout 
the above criticisms of the Executive order and the attendant gui-
dance. For instance, if the Federal Rules amendment covering 
mandatory prediscovery disclosure does not preempt the order's 
strictures on disclosure of core information,239 the administration 
should require that more information be divulged earlier in the liti-
gation process. Other procedures that should be retained are the 
order's prescriptions for governmental participation in settlement 
235. The Rules Enabling Act, arguably, would accord Federal Rules precedence over pro· 
cedures prescribed in an Executive order, especially when the Federal Rules are more strin-
gent. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (1988) (mandating that rules of evidence, practice, and 
procedure prescribed by Supreme Court take precedence over any conflicting rules); supra 
note 195 and accompanying text (noting that local rules adopted by district courts must be 
consistent with Federal Rules or U.S. Code provisions); supra text accompanying notes 129-31 
(indicating that Federal Rules arc more rigorous than executive branch reforms). 
236. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4369-70 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (proposing to Congress amend· 
ments to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PROPOSED AMENDMENT OF FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 11, at 43-58 (Sept. 1992) (pro· 
viding proposed revisions to rule 11 sanctioning procedures); see also supra notes 63-65 and 
accompanying text (explaining order's sanctioning provisions). See generally Tobias, Proposed 
Revision, supra note 233 (discussing proposed amendments to rule 11, which are designed to 
lessen sanctioning activity). 
237. See Tobias, Reconsidering Rule I I, supra note 172, at 875-77, 880-93 (discussing provi-
sions for "safe harbors," which provide litigants opportunity to correct improper behavior 
before sanctions are issued, and reduced fee shifting, which limits effect of sanctions imposed 
under rule 11); see also Tobias, Proposed Revision, supra note 233 (examining proposed amend· 
ments that arc intended to reduce rule 11 activity by making pursuit of sanctions more bur-
densome). Indeed, the drafters' intent to reduce the rule's invocation apparently provoked 
Justice Scalia's dissent. See 61 U.S.L.W. 4365, 4369-70 (U.S. Apr. 27, 1993) (suggesting that 
rule 11 be amended). 
238. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, § l(f), 3 C.F.R. 359, 362 (1991), reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (Supp. III 1991) (providing executive branch position on sanctions). 
239. See supra note 235 and accompanying text (noting probable preemption by Federal 
Rules of Executive order). 
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conferences and ADR.240 It may be possible to calibrate the re-
tained litigation requirements by delineating specific techniques 
that apply with greater or less efficacy in various contexts. For in-
stance, considerable evidence suggests that some environmental 
disputes are comparatively amenable to resolution through the use 
of certain ADR mechanisms.241 
The Clinton administration should undertake a concerted effort 
to make executive branch reform function smoothly. The adminis-
tration ought to clarify any aspects of the Executive order and Jus-
tice Department guidelines that remain ambiguous. 242 It should do 
everything feasible to maximize consistency among the plethora of 
procedures that apply to federal civil litigation. One approach men-
tioned previously is to reconcile the executive branch procedures 
with the forthcoming Federal Rules amendments.243 The adminis-
tration should similarly attempt to integrate the order's provisions 
with measures prescribed pursuant to the CJRA in the ninety-four 
judicial districts. Although complete uniformity is obviously unat-
tainable, considerable consistency can be secured, for instance, by 
making the order's procedures closely resemble those applicable in 
the largest number of districts.244 
Once the Clinton administration has instituted the above sugges-
tions, it should revise the Executive order and Justice Department 
guidance, as warranted, and promulgate modified requirements. 
The administration should guarantee that executive branch reform 
is vigorously implemented and rigorously evaluated. It should reex-
amine the effort periodically, perhaps yearly, focusing its examina-
tion on those features that are controversial or the efficacy of which 
is unclear. The administration should correspondingly attempt to 
minimize inconsistency among applicable procedures and to maxi-
mize coordination of executive branch reform. When these reviews 
240. See Exec. Order No. 12,778, §§ l(b)-(c), 3 C.F.R. at 360-61, reprinted in 28 U.S.C. 
§ 519 (containing provisions regarding settlement and ADR). 
241. See, e.g., GAIL BINGHAM, RESOLVING ENVIRONMENTAL DISPUTES: A DECADE OF EXPERI-
ENCE 140-47 (1986) (evaluating success of environmental dispute resolution alternatives); see 
also Lawrence Susskind & Gerard McMahon, The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 
YALE J. ON REG. 133, 133-65 (1985) (examining negotiated rulemaking procedures in EPA 
cases as alternative to traditional notice and comment process). 
242. See supra text accompanying notes 144-49, 160-67, 176-77 (commenting on deficien-
cies of Executive order in areas of sanctions, settlement, and ADR). 
243. See supra text accompanying notes 232-38 (addressing need for Clinton administra-
tion to reconcile Executive order with Federal Rules amendments that become effective in 
December 1993). 
244. This may vary depending on the specific procedures at issue. For instance, if the 
Federal Rules proposals become effective, prediscovery disclosure and rule 11 sanctioning 
should be uniform. See supra text accompanying note 238 (suggesting method to harmonize 
dissimilar reform provisions). Considerable discrepancy probably will remain among judicial 
districts in the areas of settlement and expert testimony. 
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indicate ways of improving the reforms, the order and the guide-
lines should be modified accordingly. 
CONCLUSION 
The civil justice reform effort that the Bush administration initi-
ated in the executive branch remains nascent. The endeavor could 
reduce expense and delay in the federal civil litigation to which the 
United States is a party, might provide instructive experimentation 
with efficacious procedures, and may permit the Government to 
serve as a model for private litigants. That potential could be real-
ized if the Clinton administration follows the above recommenda-
tions. The administration should vigorously implement the 
Executive order and the Justice Department guidance, rigorously 
evaluate the resultant experimentation, and broadly eKplore addi-
tional mechanisms that will decrease cost and delay. Once the ad-
ministration has collected, analyzed, and synthesized the relevant 
information, it should refine the executive branch procedures as in-
dicated and continue experimentation that will reduce expense and 
delay in civil cases. 
